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THE AUTHORITATIVE LAWSAYING POWER OF THE STATE
SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: CONFLICTS OF
JUDICIAL ORTHODOXY IN THE
BUSH-GORE LITIGATION
ANN ALTHOUSE*
What did the courts do in the Bush-Gore litigation?' Did the
United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court behave
in a pure and properly judicial mode? Or did the various justices,
state and federal, vying for an illicit power to decide the election out-
right, act as if they were not judges at all, but ordinary voters stuffing a
ballot box? Perhaps most observers will agree that the courts were
doing something somewhere between those two extremes,2 but we will
disagree about where the Bush-Gore litigation lies on the continuum
that runs from pristine neutral principles to raw political power and
whether the United States Supreme Court or the Florida Supreme
Court deserves more blame for deviating from the path of judicial
orthodoxy.3
The United States Constitution enlists the states in the process of
electing the President.4 The Framers considered giving Congress the
role of selecting the President but, consistent with a plan of balancing
the branches of the federal government, rejected giving so much
* Irma M. & Robert W. Arthur-Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin Law
School.
1. The reference, of course, is to the litigation that took place in the state of Florida
following the very close 2000 presidential election between Republican candidate George
W. Bush and Democratic candidate Al Gore, Jr. See, e.g., Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Bush /]; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000);
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bush I1].
2. Some commentators have taken the extreme position that the United States Su-
preme Court Justices in the majority in Bush II did nothing more than vote for President
and try to cover it up with legal obfuscation. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Contempt of Court, in
BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 337 (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William
Kristol eds., 2001).
3. The commentary is already voluminous. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES
THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001); RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: TI-IE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Epstein eds., 2001); BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY, supra
note 2; Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of
the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1361 (2001).
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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power to the legislature. The idea of the Electoral College emerged
because of concerns about trusting any ongoing institution with the
selection of the President; a group of electors chosen to meet solely to
vote for the President (and Vice President), because they would be
identified so late in the process, would be difficult to corrupt.5 This
Electoral College system required a mechanism for choosing the elec-
tors. Here, the Constitution gave the state legislatures the task, to be
performed independently within each state, of determining how to
appoint the electors.6 It was only over time, at the decision of the
various state legislatures, acting one by one, that the approach of us-
ing the state's general population to vote for the electors became the
uniform method throughout the country.7
Underlying this uniformity in the use of a general election to ap-
point the electors are many complexities and variations among the
states in the details about who may vote, the methods and machinery
for taking and counting the vote, and the processes for ironing out
disputes that arise in the vote taking and counting. The 2000 election
shone a sudden bright light on these complexities, forcing us to think
about these previously almost invisible matters. We had to try to
fathom perplexing legal texts and institutional structures at a time
when we were already intensely committed to one candidate or an-
other. An area of law that would have been confusing enough to con-
template at leisure suddenly needed to be seen through the emotional
fog of caring deeply about who would win and who would lose.
The statutory law in question came not only from the state's legis-
lature, but from the national level. The United States Constitution
gave Congress the role of counting the ballots produced by the Electo-
ral College and declaring the winner.8 To deal with the questions that
can arise about the validity of the ballots in the context of carrying out
this constitutionally assigned function, Congress has legislated to set
5. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 109-10 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1966) (July 25, 1787 statement of James Madison).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors .... ").
7. SeeJUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE
OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 16 (1971). Efforts over the years to amend the Constitution to
reform or abolish the Electoral College have failed. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Electoral College
Reform: DO]d Vu, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 993 (2001) (reviewing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM
AND CONTINUrT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
(1971); BEST, supra; LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & ALAN G. BRAUN, THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL
COLLEGE REFORM (1972)) (describing the history of efforts to reform the Electoral College
through 1970).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XII.
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out procedures to regulate how it will perform this function.9 This is
the statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, that became so important in the Bush-Gore
litigation. Further complicating the written law at issue in the Bush-
Gore dispute were provisions of both the Florida and the United
States Constitutions.' °
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the legal picture was the
courts. All of the written law-statutory and constitutional, state and
federal-lies inert on paper pages until the judges bring it to life by
applying it, enforcing it, and, necessarily, interpreting it. The judges
too were human beings encountering complex and often unfamiliar
law, acting under the pressure of time and of caring about who would
win and who would lose. But this was not the sort of situation where
the judges could recuse themselves, as they might in ordinary cases in
which they had too much interest in the outcome. Everyone cared
about the outcome, and someone needed to decide.
At the center of the problem about judges was an exceptionally
difficult matter that will be the focus of this Article: a state's highest
court is the final, authoritative expositor of a state's statutory and con-
stitutional law, and the United States Supreme Court is the final, au-
thoritative expositor of federal statutory and constitutional law.11 The
state supreme court deals with a case first, and that position enables it
to nail down points of state law in ways that may limit what a later
court may do. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
the "independent and adequate state ground doctrine," according to
which it cannot review a decision of a state court unless its own deci-
sion on a question of federal law will have an effect on the outcome.' 2
Yet the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is itself a
matter of federal law, the interpretation of which lies within the final
lawsaying authority of the United States Supreme Court. The United
9. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). The statute provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or con-
test concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by
judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been
made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at
least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and
shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution,
and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed
by such State is concerned.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 39-63.
11. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945) (explaining the need for the
independent and adequate state ground doctrine).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.
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States Supreme Court, because it deals with a case last, is in a position
to shred the insulation of state law grounds that the state court may
have used in an effort to protect itself from review. The degree of
judicial purity with which the various Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court and the Florida Supreme Court wielded their respective
final interpretive authority is itself a matter of great complexity that
court watchers have had to try to think about quickly and through the
thick emotional fog of caring all too much about who won the presi-
dency and who did not.
I cannot place myself outside of this emotional fog that has inevi-
tably and understandably distorted the writing that has followed the
election. During the legal fight for the presidency, I eagerly em-
braced the arguments offered by proponents of the man for whom I
voted. The arguments made for the other side often seemed incoher-
ent and even outrageous to me. As I pored over the state and federal
statutory and constitutional law, read and reread every opinion as it
was issued, listened and relistened to the broadcast oral arguments, I
saw the dispute through my alternately stimulated hopes that my man
would win and fears that he would lose. Now, with the game over and
a bit of perspective on the legal battle, I want to look back on the
litigation and the central questions it gave rise to about whether the
Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court took the
larger step over the bounds of judicial propriety.
Part I of this Article considers the first stage of the litigation in
which the United States Supreme Court sought clarification about
whether the Florida Supreme Court, when it extended the period for
recounting ballots, intended to rely on state statutory law or state con-
stitutional law. The Article shows that the remand was not necessary
and that it created an opportunity for the Florida Supreme Court to
attempt to insulate itself from further review by stating that it relied
only on state statutory law. Demonstrating that Bush I involved a sub-
tle variation on the independent and adequate state ground doctrine,
the Article contends that precedent would have supported a presump-
tion that the state court relied on the ground for decision that would
have presented a federal law question for the United States Supreme
Court to decide. This part of the Article speculates that the United
States Supreme Court saw the remand as desirable because it enabled
the Court to cue the Florida Supreme Court to rein in its activities
without revealing disagreements that were already dividing the Court,
thus preserving its own image as a fair and neutral institution, capable




Part II of the Article looks at the second stage of the litigation as
it unfolded in the state court system, leading to the Florida Supreme
Court's order of a statewide recount. This Part of the Article contrasts
the trial judge's deference to the authority of the individual county
canvassing boards and the state supreme court's avoidance of defer-
ence to the trial judge. The Article notes the state supreme court's
efforts to frame its decision entirely in terms of state statutory law and
its off-handed concession in a footnote that the state procedures must
yield to the "stringent calendar controlled by federal law,"1 3 i.e., De-
cember 12. This Part concludes that the Florida Supreme Court's
own failure to defer to other state institutions undercuts arguments
that the scrutiny it later received from the United States Supreme
Court was inconsistent with established ideas about federalism and ju-
dicial restraint.
Part III of the Article examines this case-"Bush II"-as it first
reached the United States Supreme Court, in the Court's opinion
granting a stay of the statewide recount. Here, the Article minimizes
criticisms that accuse the Court of prejudging the merits of the case,
because the likelihood of success on the merits is a proper part of the
analysis of whether a stay ought to be granted. This part of the Article
does, however, question the analysis of injury, comparing it to the
analysis of injury in the standing doctrine cases. Although the Jus-
tices' difference of opinion about the injury needed for a stay tracks a
conservative-liberal preference for presidential candidate, the Article
observes that the Justices' conservative-liberal split can be attributed to
different subjective judgments about whether the statewide recount
had produced an intolerably chaotic situation that required immedi-
ate control. That explanation does not place the Justices at the most
desirable level of neutrality, but it does refute the accusation that they
resorted to outright political choice.
Part IV of the Article, which considers the final disposition of
Bush II in the United States Supreme Court decision that ended the
recount, concentrates on the question of whether the United States
Supreme Court usurped the Florida Supreme Court's authority over
state law. Part IV.A analyzes the per curiam opinion, which, by find-
ing equal protection violations, initially avoided entanglements with
questions of state law. In the end, however, to determine that the
recount could not continue, it needed to identify December 12 as the
deadline, and the deadline was a matter of state law. This Part consid-
13. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 n.II (Fla. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Harris 11].
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ers the argument raised by Justices Breyer and Souter that the case
ought to have been remanded to the state court to determine the
deadline. Given the state court's authority over state law, one could
say that the United States Supreme Court would need to ask the state
court whether the state legislature, despite its intent to meet the safe
harbor, placed a higher value on the search for additional votes on
unread ballots. Emphasizing the concession that the Florida Supreme
Court made in a footnote, the Article contends that that court had
already determined that the recount had to yield to the December 12
deadline. The Article views the United States Supreme Court's reli-
ance on that determination as justified because the interest in ending
the controversy outweighed the possible benefits of giving a second
opportunity to a court that had generated mistrust of its willingness to
interpret state law in a fair and neutral manner.
Part 1V.B considers the much more extensive engagement with
state law interpretation in the concurring opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, which found that the state court had usurped the
role of the state legislature, thus violating Article II, by substituting its
own approach to the post-election day proceedings. Here, the Article
stresses that the Chief Justice did not claim a power to interpret state
law, but rather a power to reject what he found to be a sham assertion
about state law. The Article also shows thatJustices Souter and Breyer
did not disagree with the proposition that it is possible for the state
court to distort statutory interpretation to the point where it should
be seen as displacing the state legislature. Their disagreement with
the Chief Justice was really about whether the Florida Supreme Court
did in fact go too far. Part JV.C considers the dissenting opinions of
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, who premised their harsh attacks on
assertions that the majority was hypocritical about federalism and judi-
cial restraint. Clearing away the rhetoric, the Article views the crucial
disagreement to be about whether the state court deserved deference.
I. BusH I
A. How Safely in a Safe Harbor Must One Be to Be Safe? The State's
Attempt to Accept the Section 5 Offer
The federal statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, does not purport to tell the
states what they must do to carry out their constitutional responsibili-
ties. Considering that the Constitution directly assigns a role to the
states, one ought not to perceive a constitutional grant of power to
Congress to regulate the way the states perform their role. The fed-
eral statute simply represents Congress restricting itself in the per-
formance of its own role in the constitutional process of selecting the
2002] 513
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President. 4 That statute commits Congress in advance to a method
of handling the electoral ballots produced by the states' processes.
The states are obligated by the Constitution to produce elec-
tors t5 but they are not obligated to jump through particular hoops
Congress might want to set up, and indeed Congress has not de-
manded that they do so. Congress has, however, exercised a power to
affect the process at the state level by making an offer to the state
legislatures. Through 3 U.S.C. § 5, Congress has told the states, we
will not question the validity of your ballots if you meet our require-
ments: appoint the electors according to a plan that you have set up
before election day and that is completed at least six days before the
day when the electors vote. Thus, the statute defines a "safe harbor"
for the states.16 Congress cannot prevent a state from doing other
things, but if a state wants to hold Congress to its commitment not to
question the validity of the state's certified electors, the state must
jump through the federal statutory hoops.
The Florida legislature had set up its plan prior to the 2000 presi-
dential election and, apparently, meant to take advantage of the safe
harbor.' 7 But the state's statutory election law is complicated; its
many parts created gray areas that might only become important in
the process of applying the law to particular facts.'" A court attempt-
ing to resolve these ambiguities would therefore invite speculation
about whether it was really following the statute or not, yet the state's
statutory scheme itself assigns the state's courts a role in the electoral
process.19 The question of whether a court is dutifully following the
law or making law of its own is, of course, the subject of longstanding
debate among legal scholars and other court watchers. But 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 gave the old conundrum a new urgency: if the courts were devising
their own plan after the election, replacing the statutory plan that was
put in place before the election in accordance with § 5, then the state
14. The role of Congress with respect to the presidential election is described in the
United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XII.
15. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors ....").
16. None of the opinions in any of the Supreme Court cases in the Bush-Gore litigation
viewed § 5 as a requirement; the interpretation that the statute is only the offer of a safe
harbor was unanimous. See Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam); id. at 113 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring); id. at 124 (StevensJ., dissenting); id. at 130 (SouterJ., dissenting);
id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. See infra text accompanying note 88.
18. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 116-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
19. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(1) (West Supp. 2002) (amended 2002) (providing
that "the certification of election or nomination ... may be contested in the circuit
court").
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would be in danger of losing the safe-harbor treatment, which would
permit Congress to question the validity of the state's electoral votes.
The Florida courts in the Bush-Gore litigation were never so bold
as to flagrantly substitute a plan entirely of their own making for the
state statutory plan. The problem was one of judicial interpretation
becoming too creative, raising doubts about whether it truly reflected
the legislature's intent or whether it had become an expression of the
judges' own preferences. The judges may have pulled away from the
securest mooring in the harbor, but had they drifted entirely out into
the open sea? There must be an ambiguous area where the state
court's work is only creating a risk about whether the state has satisfied
the requirements of § 5, where one must guess a bit about whether
Congress will see the result of the state's processes as having crossed
the hypothetical line that separates the harbor from the sea. Assessing
that risk is complicated by the extreme importance of the decision: if
the point were reached where Congress needed to make a decision
about whether the result of a particular state's electoral process had
successfully met the requirements of § 5, the various members of Con-
gress called upon to discern the line between the harbor and the sea
would make their decision under the immensely powerful influence
of their desire to hand the presidency to their own party's candidate.
From this prediction about how Congress would behave we might
very well conclude that the Florida legislature, in its effort to meet the
§ 5 standard, intended to set up a procedure that would obviously and
unquestionably demonstrate that the § 5 requirements were met.z°
According to this conclusion, taking advantage of the safe harbor
means mooring securely in the harbor. That is, the legislature meant
to exclude the kind of judicial flexibility and creativity that might
leave a way for those highly motivated members of Congress to wriggle
out of their statutory commitment. The Florida legislature neverthe-
less wrote a statute that contained ambiguities and that brought the
state courts into the process; from that, we might conclude that the
20. The problem of knowing too much about which candidate is helped and which
candidate is hurt by different procedures is exactly the problem that 3 U.S.C. § 5 is sup-
posed to solve: it demands a system put in place before election day, before anyone knows
who benefits from one method or another. A well-functioning state legislature should per-
ceive the problem too and want to clearly define procedures in its statute. It should want
to do this even without the incentive of § 5. The existence of the federal statute puts even
more pressure on the state legislature to nail down the procedures prior to election: now
there is not only the force of the best policy choice, but also the benefits offered by the safe
harbor.
20021
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legislature did not choose the securest mooring in the safe harbor.21
One could still maintain that the Florida courts, as they performed
their role in the statutory scheme, ought to have resolved each ambi-
guity in the statute to leave the least leeway for Congress to avoid its
obligation,2 2 but the state statutory law itself did not in its terms com-
pel the state courts to adopt this interpretive approach.
B. Lawsaying Orthodoxy: State Courts Are the Final Expositors of State
Law; the United States Supreme Court Is the Final Expositor of
Federal Law
Even if that state statute could or should be interpreted with an
eye toward meeting the safe harbor created by the federal statute, the
interpretation of the state statute is a matter of state law. It is axio-
matic that the state court has final authority over the interpretation of
a state's law. Assume it makes sense to say that the Florida statute
should have been interpreted to demand strict adherence to every ex-
plicit point in the state statutory scheme. Extending a deadline, as the
Florida Supreme Court did in the first stage of the litigation,23 would
21. Because the statute covered all elections, it cannot be read as an all-out effort to
respond to § 5. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.021(7) (defining "election" as including any "pri-
mary election, special primary election, special election, general election, or presidential
preference primary election"). One could infer that the legislature ignored § 5; it was after
all only a remote possibility. The more common use of the Florida statutory scheme would
be to resolve controversies in the many local elections, and that more present concern
should affect the interpretation of the statute that just happened to become so important
in the case of this one fluky presidential election.
22. A remote question, never reached in the litigation, is whether a decision by Con-
gress whether the state's ballots met the safe harbor definition would be justiciable. See
infra text accompanying notes 300-301.
23. The Florida Supreme Court did vary the deadlines. In its opinion of November 21,
2000, Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000)
[hereinafter Harris I], the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language per-
mitting a hand recount in the event of an "error in vote tabulation" to cover the situation
where the machine recount failed to read all of the ballots that might convey the "intent of
the voter" to the human eye. Id. at 1229. This interpretation rejected Governor Bush's
contention that the statute referred only to a malfunction of the machine. Governor Bush
had argued that the machine did not malfunction, but performed as it was designed to do
when it missed incompletely punched cards, and thus that it did not make an "error in vote
tabulation." See id. The Florida Supreme Court, however, held that the Florida legisla-
ture's use of the term "intent of the voter" warranted a broader interpretation of "error in
vote tabulation." Id. The Florida Supreme Court also rejected Bush's interpretation of the
nature of the deadline for certification. Id. at 1233. The statute provided for certification
seven days after the election, but confusingly used the words "may" and "shall" in different
places in the statute when assigning the state Secretary of State the task of certifying the
election. The Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, had issued an opinion on November 13
that she was required to certify the results of the election on November 14, which was seven
days after the election. Id. at 1226. In fact, according to the Florida Supreme Court, she
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violate this interpretive approach because deviating from strict adher-
ence to specified deadlines created the potential for members of Con-
gress to follow their self-interest if, later on, they faced the question
whether the state's procedures came within the safe harbor. A court
truly concerned about the safe harbor would have resisted giving Con-
gress this leverage.
Yet what role can there be for the United States Supreme Court
to impose a particular approach to interpreting a state statute? State
law means what the state supreme court says it means. If the Florida
Supreme Court found a different legislative intent or submerged legis-
lative intent under other concerns, what can be said except that is
what state law is? The Florida Supreme Court can infuse the statutory
text with values about the sanctity of the vote or a generalized notion
of the good or any sort of outlandish notion, and, because of its final
interpretive authority, that is what state law is. It is "infallible" in the
special sense of a court at the top of a hierarchy of interpretation:
infallible because it is final.24 It matters not that the United States
Supreme Court may consider the Florida Supreme Court's opinion an
abysmal interpretation of state law: it is a simple matter of judicial
authority.
For the United States Supreme Court to become involved, a ques-
tion of federal law must affect the outcome.25 The question cannot be
simply whether the Florida procedure complied with § 5 because § 5
does not even purport to regulate the states. It defines a safe harbor,
but the outcome of the case did not depend on what § 5 really meant.
Section 5 was simply a factor that may have affected how the Florida
legislature thought about its own statutory scheme, something that
the Florida court may have used as it gave the final, authoritative ex-
position of the statute pursuant to its own method of interpretation.
The state court could follow an approach to statutory interpretation
that had as a component the intent of the legislature, but nothing
forced it to give any particular weight to legislative intent balanced
against other factors or even to give predominance to considerations
of legislative intent. Nothing forced the state court to determine that
had discretion to extend the deadline and abused her discretion by not extending the
deadline to November 18. Id. at 1238-39. On the theory that this abuse set the counting
back five days, the Florida Supreme Court added five more days of counting beyond the
date of its opinion, thus extending the deadline to November 26. Id. at 1240.
24. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
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the legislative intent was in fact to moor as securely as possible in the
§ 5 safe harbor. 26
On what federal question, then, did the United States Supreme
Court rely? The Florida Supreme Court had laced its statutory inter-
pretation with references to the Florida constitution. 27 The point of
these references was not clear. They might have been mere surplus-
age. They might have been a component of statutory interpretation.
But perhaps the Florida Supreme Court meant to trump the provi-
sions of the state statute with state constitutional law. Ordinarily,
there would be nothing for the United States Supreme Court to re-
view if the state court issued a decision that relied on state legal texts
and asserted the superiority of the state's constitution to the state's
statutory law. But the United States Supreme Court perceived a way in
which the United States Constitution might, in this one instance,
make the state statutory law superior to state constitutional law. 28 The
United States Constitution, from its position at the top of the hierar-
chy of legal texts, presumably has the capacity to rearrange the prior-
ity of legal texts that rank lower in the hierarchy. Perhaps here, in
designating the process for appointing the electors for the President
of the United States, the Constitution gave a final and independent
authority to the state legislatures. If it had, and if the Florida Su-
preme Court had used the state constitution to trump the state stat-
ute, there would be a federal question for the United States Supreme
Court to decide.29
This interpretation of Article II would essentially provide a fed-
eral,judicially enforceable, constitutional law of state legislative immu-
nity from state court supervision. The state courts could be used to
the extent that the legislature chose to involve them in carrying out
the procedures it created. The courts would then apply the statutes,
but could not take on any larger role than exactly what the legislature
wanted them to do. In this one unusual case, the interpretation of the
state legislature's fulfillment of its Article II duty, the division of power
between the state legislature and the state courts might be a matter of
federal constitutional law, a species of separation of powers law, gov-
erning the relationship between the state legislature and the state
courts, a matter otherwise covered only by state law.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22 (discussing strong reasons for a state legis-
lature to choose to moor securely in the safe harbor to deprive Congress of the room to
maneuver toward its preferred outcome).
27. See Harris 1, 772 So. 2d at 1228, 1230, 1236, 1238.
28. See Bush I, 531 U.S. 70, 75-78 (2000) (per curiam).
29. See id.
[VOL. 61:508
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In Bush I, the United States Supreme Court did not go so far as to
declare that Article II in fact does control the way that the state court
could interpret the state statutory law. The Court raised this question,
relied on it as the reason for its own power to take the case at all, but
ultimately remanded the case.3° The Court, in a unanimous per
curiam opinion, asked for a clarification about state law.3' If the Flor-
ida Supreme Court explained that it had used the Florida constitution
to support its decision to extend the deadline for hand counting the
ballots, then a question would arise as to whether the state court had
violated Article II by taking away what was an exclusively legislative
role. -1
2
Even if the Florida Supreme Court had relied on the state consti-
tution, the argument that it had violated Article II might still have
failed. One could say that Article II, in assigning the task of determin-
ing how to appoint the electors, meant to take the state legislatures as
it found them, as institutions embedded in a whole state government,
a system that would necessarily include a constitution and a judicial
system to confine all acts of the legislature to that constitution.3 In
that light, one could accept as consistent with Article II the state
court's use of state constitutional law as a restriction on the meaning
of state statutory law-even if it meant casting the state out of the safe
harbor. The safe harbor statute never had the power to compel the
state; it was only an offer that the states could choose to accept. Un-
like the federal statute, the federal constitutional provision in Article
II does bind the states. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that Article II
does not have that special, restrictive meaning that envisions the state
legislature acting-for this one purpose-outside of its usual place
within a tripartite state government.
Moreover, even if Article II did endow the state legislature with
this special power, a state legislature might nevertheless choose to exer-
cise its power subject to the constraints of its own constitution. Even
though it may be true that in many cases a legislature might resist the
limitations the courts might impose as a matter of state constitutional
law, a legislature setting up a voting scheme might affirmatively
choose to embed that scheme within the state's constitutional law of
voting rights. At oral argument, in the following colloquy with Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe, who represented Al Gore, Justice Scalia revealed
his doubts that a legislature would intend any such thing:
30. Id. at 73.
31. Id. at 78.
32. See id.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 261-264, 295-298.
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[SCALIA]: Professor Tribe, can I ask you why you think the
Florida legislature delegated to the Florida Supreme Court
the authority to interpose the Florida Constitution? I mean,
maybe your experience with the legislative branch is differ-
ent from mine, but in my experience they are resigned to the
intervention of the courts, but have certainly never invited it.
TRIBE: Well, I'd have to say my experience parallels that.
[SCALIA]: What makes you think the Florida legislature af-
firmatively invited the Florida Supreme Court?
3 4
Ah, but again, it would be the Florida Supreme Court that would have
the final authority to decide what the Florida legislature's intent was.
Justice Scalia's doubts that it had such an intent might have had some
persuasive effect on the Florida court, but it is hard to see how the
United States Supreme Court could ever get into a position that
would enable it to reject a contrary assessment of the Florida legisla-
ture's intent.
35
The state court on remand could thus give full regard to the sug-
gested interpretation of Article II and still decide that the state's con-
stitution restricted the statute. The court would simply need to say:
although Article II frees the state legislature to disregard state consti-
tutional voting rights, we think that the state legislature intended to
respect those rights; we interpret the statute to take account of state
constitutional rights. Why assume there is a state legislative intent to
disregard rights?3 6 Does it make sense to attribute to the legislature a
low regard for voter rights? It is only after the election that everyone
had a preference about the balance between a generous or a restric-
tive approach to vote counting: at the time the statute was passed,
34. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000) (No. 00-836), 2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 70, at 65-66.
35. Justice Scalia's speculation about how legislatures think about judicial review
presents a special problem in the context of a state statutory scheme that covered all of the
state's elections. It is hard to attribute to the legislature the intent to cut off the state
court's state constitutional meddling with respect to the presidential election when it did
not set up a separate procedure solely for the presidential election. See supra note 19.
Justice Scalia seems to have wanted to impute to the legislature the maximum resistance to
judicial constitutional review, even at the price of having the state election code mean two
different things depending on whether the election was a presidential one or not, not
because the Florida legislature knew of the option or meant to take it, but simply on the
general assumption that legislatures do not want constitutional limitations.
36. The United States Supreme Court frequently interprets federal statutes on the as-
sumption that Congress means to frame statutes within constitutional limits. See, e.g., Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) (avoiding a conflict with the Commerce Clause by attributing to Congress
an intent to reach only navigable waters in § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act).
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such things were a neutral matter. Of course, when the state court
was doing the interpretation, the period of neutrality had passed-the
judges knew which candidate they were helping by being restrictive or
generous about vote counting.
One might argue that the state courts ought to use a particularly
strict interpretation of the state statute at this point in order to pre-
serve the outcome-blindness that existed at the time the state statutes
were passed. Any judicial creativity at this point-albeit in the name
of state constitutional rights-has too much potential to be infected
with the judges' preferences for one candidate over another. Rights
are important, and the state legislature should be bound by those
rights, but trusting the pre-election scheme may still be better than
trusting the judges after they are in a position to know the effect of
their decision on particular candidates. This may be a nice theory of
interpretation, but who is in the position to impose it? It is a matter of
state law, and the state court is the final interpreter of that law.
Because the state court would be exercising its final authority
with the blindfold off, and the legislature, because it acted before the
election, set terms for resolving disputes without knowing who would
be helped by which procedures, one ought to see the legislature as the
more trustworthy, legitimate institution for setting the ground rules
for the election. Usually the legislature is the institution more influ-
enced by raw political preference, and the court is the institution that
we ought to trust to judge the cases of particular individuals in a neu-
tral and fair way. But in the instance of deciding the procedures to
govern the resolution of an election dispute, the tables are turned.
Yet even if the pre-existing legislation is a more reliable embodiment
of the rule of law, that legislation must still be applied. The courts
have been designated by the legislation itself to decide the real cases
that arise under the statutory scheme, and the role of the state courts
in interpreting state law must necessarily follow.
C. The Needlessness of the Remand to State Court
Why did the United States Supreme Court, by vacating and re-
manding the case, offer the Florida Supreme Court the opportunity to
insulate itself from further review? It seemed all too easy for the Flor-
37. One could conceive of partisan maneuvers that could be accomplished by statutory
law put in place before the election. For example, one could deliberately assign less relia-
ble voting machinery to the districts that favor one's political opponents. This was not the
case in Florida in 2000, however, because the voting machinery was chosen at the local
level, a decision-making process dominated by the party that had the greatest hope of
benefiting by more votes being counted.
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ida Supreme Court to embed the values it had previously derived from
the state's constitution in a discussion of the intent of the legisla-
ture.3" If the United States Supreme Court at that point thought the
Florida Supreme Court had strategically tried to insulate itself with a
false assertion about state law, it would be quite hard to find a way to
state a ground for reversal. A straightforward "We don't believe you"
would fall short of the conventions of craftsmanship and comity.
Considering the troubles that might lie ahead, one might imag-
ine that some jurisdictional necessity required the United State Su-
preme Court to remand the case. Yet in fact there was no
jurisdictional bar to deciding the federal question, the Article II ques-
tion, that the Court found in Bush L The 1984 case of Michigan v.
Long" is instructive. There, it was unclear whether the state court had
relied on a federal constitutional ground or a state constitutional
ground, as both sources of law offered the criminal defendant a basis
for excluding the evidence that led to his conviction.40 If the state
court had made its independent reliance on the state law ground
clear, the state law ground would have been adequate to support the
result, and it would thus have been irrelevant whether or not the fed-
eral law would also support the result. If the state court had made a
clear statement, in fact, the United States Supreme Court's opinion
about federal law would be an advisory opinion because it would not
affect the outcome of the case. Because Article III of the United
States Constitution limits the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, to deciding cases or controversies, and the Court's decision on
the federal question would overstep the bounds that limit the power
of the third branch. This is the "independent and adequate state
ground" bar to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.41
When the state court has not made its reliance on the state law
ground clear, the Supreme Court does not face a flat constitutional
bar to its jurisdiction, though it does face ajurisdictional problem. In
Michigan v. Long, the Court decided to presume that the state court
did not independently rely on the state law ground.42 It then decided
that the Michigan Supreme Court had erred in its decision of federal
law and remanded the case for further proceedings.43 The state court
on remand could then have clarified its original decision and asserted
38. See infra text accompanying notes 87-109.
39. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
40. See id. at 1037-38.
41. Id. at 1040.
42. Id. at 1044.
43. Id. at 1053-54.
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that it really did mean to rely independently on state law, which would
change the outcome. It may seem strange that the state court would
be in a position to reverse the outcome produced by a decision of the
United States Supreme Court, but there is no disturbance of the hier-
archies of judicial authority. The state's highest court would simply
have asserted its authority over state law, and its decision that the state
law has a meaning different from similarly worded federal law is not a
decision of federal law.4 4 The United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion of federal law does not somehow become an advisory opinion
retroactively. A federal district court is also subject to the ban on advi-
sory opinions,4 5 yet we do not think of federal district court decisions
as turning into advisory opinions if they are reversed on appeal.
When the United States Supreme Court presumes the
nonindependence of the state law ground and issues an opinion on
the federal law ground, only to have its presumption rebutted on re-
mand, the United States Supreme Court opinion is not merely advi-
sory. At the point when the Court made its decision, there was still a
"case or controversy": the decision had an effect on the position of the
parties, and the Court's articulation of the law was not merely an ab-
stract lesson in the meaning of the law.46
In Bush I, the United States Supreme Court was not looking at a
state supreme court opinion that had mixed up its discussion of a fed-
eral law ground and a state law ground. The Florida Supreme Court
had mixed up two state law grounds-the state statute and the state
constitution. Nevertheless, one of these grounds was a state law
ground that was adequate to support the outcome aside from any-
thing the United States Supreme Court could do, and one was not. If
the Florida Supreme Court had clearly rested independently on the
interpretation of the state statute, there seemed to be no question of
federal law presented in the case that was capable of changing the
outcome.47 If the Florida Supreme Court had rested on the state con-
stitution, the state law ground would not be adequate to support the
44. See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1506-07 (1987) (explaining that the state court's subsequent opinion
interpreting state law does not render the earlier United States Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of federal law merely advisory because there was a genuine controversy at the time of
that interpretation).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. III (vesting the "Judicial Power" in both the United States Su-
preme Court and the inferior federal courts, and defining "Judicial Power" wholly in terms
of "cases" and "controversies").
46. See Althouse, supra note 44, at 1506-07 (noting the absence of mere advisoriness in
this situation).
47. But see infra text accompanying notes 207-252 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurring opinion in Bush II, which demonstrates how an Article II question can be sal-
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
result because that basis for decision, even though it is a state law
question, necessarily implicates a federal question that is capable of
changing the outcome. That federal question is: does Article II's as-
signment of the task of determining how to appoint the presidential
electors exclude the use of the state constitution?
On one interpretation of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion,
there is a state law ground that leaves no federal question for the
United States Supreme Court to determine. That question had al-
ready reached the top of the hierarchy ofjudicial authority: it is a state
law question decided by the state's highest court. On another inter-
pretation of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, there is a state
court decision that has not reached the top of the hierarchy ofjudicial
authority. The Florida Supreme Court is the final authority on the
meaning of the state's constitution, but that interpretation of state
constitutional law is subject to the United States Supreme Court's au-
thority over the interpretation of Article II, and if Article II excludes
the use of the state's constitution, that ground for the result in state
court is obliterated. So even though Bush Ipresented an independent
and adequate state ground problem more complex than that seen in
Michigan v. Long, where one ground for the state court decision was
federal and one was state law, there is the same problem of a state
court's mixing two grounds for its decision, one of which is subject to
further decision-making by the United States Supreme Court and one
of which is not.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court could have used the
Michigan v. Long presumption to avoid the trouble of remanding. In-
deed, in Long, the Court specifically rejected the time-consuming and
unwieldy approach of sending the case back to the state court for clar-
ification.48 The Long Court disparaged cases like Minnesota v. National
Tea Co.49 for "the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring
courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court."5° Yet
the Bush I Court made no mention of the Long presumption and
quoted National Tea at some length:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered
by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is
equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications
by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by
vaged where the state court writes an opinion that purports to be only statutory
interpretation).
48. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39.
49. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
50. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
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this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of
state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers
compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and
ambiguities from the opinions in such cases.5 1
Given Longs rejection of the National Tea approach of sending the
case back to the state court, the Supreme Court was surely not "com-
pel [led]"" to remand to ask the state court for clarification. The in-
terest in saving time in Bush I was far stronger, as the date for the
Electoral College vote loomed near. Why not presume the Florida
Supreme Court relied on the state constitution, give the answer to the
Article II question-can the state court use the state constitution or
not?-and send the case back to the Florida Supreme Court for fur-
ther proceedings? Notably the Long Court did reserve its right to de-
cline to use the presumption: "There may be certain circumstances in
which clarification is necessary or desirable, and we will not be fore-
closed from taking the appropriate action."5 3 Apparently, Bush I was
one of those circumstances, though the Court did not say why.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court remanded the case
without answering the Article II question in order to run out the
clock: it wanted to deprive the Florida courts of the opportunity to
carry out a recount that would satisfy the various legal requirements.
If the United States Supreme Court took its time in revealing, stage by
stage, what federal law required, by the time the Florida Supreme
Court found out exactly what would be needed to achieve a recount
that would hold up to the United States Supreme Court's scrutiny, it
would be too late to do it. This view does seem to accord with the per
curiam opinion's final resolution of the election in Bush 1154 but its
repellent cynicism urges one to look hard for other explanations.
It might be that the Justices wanted very much to produce a unan-
imous opinion. It is likely that the Justices did not all agree on the
effect of Article I, 55 and the remand for clarification enabled the
51. Bush I, 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (quoting National Tea, 309 U.S. at 557).
52. Id.
53. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 n.6.
54. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2000) (per curiam).
55. Bush 1/ does not reveal what the Court would say if the Florida Supreme Court had
used the state constitution to trump the state statute because it reviewed a decision that did
rest on the interpretation of the state statute. In Bush 17, the Chief Justice and Justices
Scalia and Thomas found an Article II violation in the state court's excessively creative
approach to statutory interpretation. See id. at 120-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The
failure of the other six Justices to join this opinion does not reveal how they would have
interpreted Article II if the state court had relied on state constitutional law. Not only
would the state court's reliance on constitutional law have presented a stronger basis for
finding an Article II violation, but also the per curiam opinion in Bush II, because it found
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Court to present a unified appearance to the public. The Court has
an interest in preserving its institutional capital; it has the ability to
bring resolution to difficult controversies, but this ability depends on
the respect that people have for the Court. The Court needs to pre-
serve the confidence that people have that it is in fact the prestigious,
weighty, neutral agent of the rule of law. The Court often splits along
a conservative-liberal fault line, but in this very conspicuous case that
split matched the conservative and liberal political preferences for
George W. Bush or Al Gore with an embarrassing starkness. Even if
the split could be justified through sophisticated legal analysis, prov-
ing, despite appearances, the Justices' devotion to the rule of law,56
people would never absorb that analysis. The Court's reputation, the
resource upon which it must draw to be able to resolve difficult con-
troversies, would decline. The Court may have deliberately chosen to
withhold its answer to the federal question in Bush I to preserve the
power it might need to step in and end a chaotic situation that might
develop later in the post-election process. At this point, in Bush I, the
Court was not in a position to end the entire controversy, so perhaps it
was thought best by all concerned to remand the case and keep the
Court's split away from public inspection.
Another, similar explanation for the remand is that the Court
had taken the case in the first place, not because it was capable of
resolving it at this point, but because it wanted to send a warning to
the Florida Supreme Court: we are watching you; we stand ready to
rein you in if you go too far.57 It would also remind and assure the
American people that the confusion in Florida was subject down the
an alternative ground for its result, did not need to reach the Article II question to dispose
of the case.
56. After Bush 11, some scholars worked to provide this support for the Court's reputa-
tion. See, e.g.,John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in THE VOTE, BUSH, GORE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 223. But the American people had long ago figured
out a way to think about the Court in the aftermath of the election. Interestingly, people
retained a fairly high opinion of the Court. See Talk of the Nation: How Americans View the
Supreme Court (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Feb. 7, 2001) (noting nearly the same approval
rating for the Supreme Court before and after its involvement in the election controversy).
Perhaps lay persons instinctively understand that there is a political element in the Court's
work. It is the legal profession that has persisted in hand wringing, demanding answers,
and, without them, holding the Court in disrepute. Some scholars have even maintained
that the presidency of George W. Bush that resulted from the Court's decision ought to
also be held in disrepute, especially with respect to any Supreme Court nominations. See,
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself Am. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (arguing that
Congress should refuse to confirm any appointees to the Supreme Court by Bush, at least
until 2004, as rebuke for the manner in which George W. Bush ascended to the
presidency).
57. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 98, 108.
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line to the stabilizing authority of a mature and eminently reliable
institution: some temporary instability is being tolerated, but the
United States Supreme Court is paying careful attention and will
make sure things go right in the end. The Justices had reason to hope
that the brief interlude of Bush Iwas all that would be necessary. The
Florida Supreme Court might control itself, realize that its too-creative
use of state law interpretation would not be permitted to decide the
presidential election, and bring matters to a neat conclusion.5 8 The
United States Supreme Court would then have resolved the contro-
versy, indirectly, by means of the remand. How subtle and palatable!
The term 'judicial restraint" may appeal to many as a good short-
hand way to explain the decision to remand in Bush . If the Justices
thought about the remand as described above, one might be tempted
to say they all committed to an attitude ofjudicial restraint, so that any
later departure from judicial restraint deserves to be condemned as
hypocritical. A similar use of the umbrella term "federalism" is also
tempting: one might say that all of the Justices "deferred" to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in Bush I, so any later failure to defer is hypocriti-
cal. The dissenting opinions in Bush II and the scholarship that
follows them indulge heavily in rhetorical accusations of hypocrisy
about judicial restraint and federalism.5 9 But this sort of rhetoric is
inaccurate and exaggerated.
Was Bush Ibased on federalism and a permanent commitment to
judicial restraint rather than the Court's own concerns about its politi-
cal capital and the limitations on the grounds that were available at
that point to resolve the case as a matter of federal law? Michigan v.
Long was a future-looking attempt to train the state courts to get it
right the first time and to deprive those courts of the political cover
that they had achieved illegitimately through muddling.6" Long's fed-
eralism was a federalism designed to make state institutions work bet-
ter: by intruding now, we provide an incentive to state courts to make
58. See id. (asserting that the remand decision in Bush I indicated the Supreme Court's
intention "to intervene if it appeared that the state court were twisting or distorting state
law").
59. See, e.g., Bush II, 531 U.S. at 13543 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial
restraint and federalism principles require the United States Supreme Court to defer to
the state supreme court); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitu-
tional Histoiy, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721, 1725 (2001) (arguing that the United States Supreme
Court's Bush II decision deviated inexplicably from the conservative Justices' views on judi-
cial restraint and federalism).
60. See Althouse, supra note 44, at 1510 (speculating that a state court that mixes state
and federal law "may have intentionally muddled the state and federal questions in order




it clear that they have relied on federal law, in which case they must
face United States Supreme Court review, or that they have relied on
state constitutional law, in which case, the state legislatures know they
can change the result by initiating the state constitutional amendment
process. 6' But Bush I was a one-of-a-kind situation because it is nor-
mally irrelevant that a state court has mixed two forms of state law.
The remand told the state court to behave better now. The remand
was thus not particularly respectful or deferential, just an acknowl-
edgement of the reality about lawsaying authority and a decision to
preserve political capital for later use.
One might have been tempted, influenced by hopes for a Gore
victory, to read Bush I as instructions to the state court on how to
insulate itself from review: just say it the right way and you, a mere
state court, can actually hand the presidential election to your pre-
ferred candidate! But the Court's recent federalism case law cannot
be accurately read to reflect a vision of absolute state autonomy, im-
pervious to the realities of national interests.62 Perhaps the only re-
spect shown the state court in Bush I was a belief that the state court
could take a hint, resolve the matter by withdrawing from its foray into
national politics and not require a second move by the Supreme
Court.6 3
61. See id. at 1509-10 (viewing Long as rejecting deference to state courts when state
courts have produced an unclear mixture of state and federal law interpretation, "because
the political branches of state government, if they believe a particular decision was dictated
by federal law, will not recognize that they can change the result by amending the state
constitution or by affecting the composition of the state courts").
62. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dia-
logue, 42 DuKE L.J. 979, 1019 (1993) (noting that both the conservative and liberal sides of
the Court reject absolute deference to the states and analyze federalism as a structure
designed to serve the interests of the people of the states).
63. Compare the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
That doctrine generally forbids federal courts from enjoining an ongoing state court pro-
ceeding that embodies state interests, even though federal court plaintiffs rely on federal
constitutional rights to challenge those proceedings. The doctrine expresses a trust in the
state courts to perform their duty under the Supremacy Clause to apply federal law, but
this trust is not absolute. Abstention is not required if the inadequacy of the state court
can be demonstrated. Moreover, abstention only temporarily trusts the state court because
the state court is subject to Supreme Court review and, if the state court proceeding is a
criminal case, to habeas corpus review in a federal district court. See generally Ann Alt-
house, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion of
Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051 (1988).
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II. BUSH II IN THE STATE COURTS
A. Not Deferring to Deference: The State Supreme Court Looks at the State
Trial Judge Looking at the County Canvassing Boards
Before the Florida Supreme Court could respond to the remand
in Bush I, the deadline for certifying the election, even as extended by
the state court,6 4 had passed. With George W. Bush the certified win-
ner, what the state statutory law designated the "protest" stage no
longer had any potential to change the outcome of the election, and a
new phase, called the "contest," became the focus of attention.6 5 The
"contest," under the Florida statutory law, required a trial,6 6 which was
conducted by Leon County Circuit Judge Sanders Sauls on December
2 and 3.67 There was intense time pressure, given the approaching
dates of December 18, when the Electoral College would vote and De-
cember 12, the date by which the electors needed to be certified in
order to qualify for safe harbor treatment under the federal statute.
At trial, Vice President Gore only produced evidence that the vot-
ing machines, functioning as they were expected to function, would
fail to record votes from ballots that had been incompletely
punched.68 Throughout the election controversy, there had been a
64. See supra note 23.
65. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000). The protest procedure seeks relief
from the county canvassing boards. Id. at 1252. Secretary of State Katherine Harris certi-
fied the election on November 26, 2000, which was the extended deadline set by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in the Bush I litigation. At the oral argument in Bush II, Justice
O'Connor expressed concern that the Florida Supreme Court had ignored the remanded
Bush Icase. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949),
2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 80, at 43. The Florida Supreme Court later that day, one assumes
not by mere coincidence, issued its opinion in Bush L The Florida court's opinion ex-
plained what was already obvious from the thoroughly statutory approach taken in its Bush
11 opinion: its earlier decision also rested entirely on statutory provisions. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1290 (Fla. 2000).
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2002) (amended 2002).
67. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1247. The statute required showing "a number of legal votes
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(3) (c). Judge Sauls held that the Florida statute required a showing, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, "that but for the irregularity or inaccuracy claimed, the result
of the election would have been different." Transcript of Bench Ruling, Gore v. Harris, No.
00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000), 2000 WL 1790621, at 3. That is, Gore had
needed to prove he would have won, not merely that sufficient votes were in question.
Gore's lawyers had only endeavored to prove that the machine had read some ballots as
indicating no vote, that, upon human inspection, would reveal the voter's clear intent, and
that the number of such ballots in the three counties Gore had "contested" exceeded
Bush's margin of victory in the state. Plaintiffs Complaint to Contest Election, Gore v.
Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000), available at http://www.c-
span.org/campaign2000/Florida/CV-00-2808a.pdf.
68. SeeJEFFREY ToOBIN, Too CLOSE TO CALL 216-20 (2001).
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difference in the position of the parties about what Florida law re-
quired. Governor Bush, who stood to benefit from the preservation of
the status quo, took the position that the statutes permitted a recount
only if the machines had malfunctioned.69 Gore, who needed a
change from the status quo, took the position that the statutes re-
quired a recount if the machines failed to recognize a vote on a ballot
that a person, inspecting it, would conclude reflected the "clear...
intent of the voter."7 ° Judge Sauls's opinion recognized that the evi-
dence presented at trial showed voter error and inaccuracy in the
punchcard machines, problems local officials had long been aware of,
but had not corrected.7' He would not, however, order any recount-
ing now to make up for that deficiency because he found that the
county canvassing boards, entrusted with decision-making through
the protest phase, had performed their task reasonably and in good
faith.72
The trial judge thus deferred to the county boards, but the Flor-
ida Supreme Court would not defer to the trial judge.73 The degree
of deference owed the county boards was a question of law, and the
judge got it wrong, according to the four justices who joined the per
curiam opinion in the state supreme court.7 4 The contest was not an
appeal from the decisions of the county boards that had taken place at
the protest stage, they said; it was a new beginning. Deference was
error, in their opinion, justifying reversal of most of what the trial
judge had decided.75 On remand, the trial judge was not asked to
exercise his discretion in fashioning appropriate relief or given any
opportunity to weigh the harms against the benefits of injunctive re-
lief, a function normally left to the trial judge. The Florida Supreme
Court itself set the sweeping terms of the relief, beyond anything re-
69. Judge Sauls did not take Gore or Bush's side on the statutory standard for when a
recount is required, but merely found this evidence could not "support or effect any re-
counting necessity" in the absence of a showing on the change in the outcome. Transcript
of Bench Ruling, supra note 67, at 3. Reversed by the Florida Supreme Court on this point,
Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1255-56, 1260-61, Sauls had thought that it was not enough to show
only that the number of uncounted ballots exceeded the difference in the votes the two
candidates received. He wanted proof by a preponderance of the evidence that these votes
would make Gore the victor. Id. at 1255.
70. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1256 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5)). Section
101.5614(5) of the Florida election code permitted the county canvassing boards to look
for a "clear indication of the intent of the voter" if it performed a manual recount, but it
was open to question what would need to be shown before a manual recount was in order.
71. Transcript of Bench Ruling, supra note 67, at 3.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1262.
74. Id at 1252.
75. Id.
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quested by the parties and extending to counties whose canvassing
boards had not even been made parties to the lawsuit.76
Chief Justice Wells, dissenting, thought Judge Sauls was right
about deferring to the county canvassing boards' decisions.77 He
thought that state statutory and judicial authority supported this def-
erence to the reasonable judgments of the local election officials.7 8
He saw no reason to imagine that the legislature would have set up
such an unworkable procedure: a fresh start for the candidate at the
contest stage would mean that judges would "hover" over every deci-
sion of the local boards.79 He accused the majority of lacking the
"self-discipline" to stay out of the political sphere; according to Wells,
it had created "serious separation-of-powers concerns," threatening a
"crisis."80
Commentary on Bush v. Gore often criticizes the United States Su-
preme Court majority for failing to give sufficient deference to the
state supreme court," but if one is going to base a critique on the idea
of deference, it is important to view the entire picture. There were
many institutions involved-judicial, legislative, and executive-at
both the state and national level. Who owed deference to whom and
who could properly sanction the failure to give proper deference are
difficult questions. Moreover, deference is never absolute. Even
where deference is owed, questions remain: How much deference is
due? How much deference is deserved? The comity the federal
courts owe state courts in the name of federalism hardly entails end-
76. See id. at 1261-62. The decision of the Florida Supreme Court ordered statewide
relief (i.e., recounting of ballots), which was not requested, in addition to permitting relief
in two of the three counties requested by Gore. Id. It is quite possible that the Florida
Supreme Court was without authority to order recounts in counties not specifically named
in the lawsuit. McConnell, supra note 57, at 113.
77. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1264 (citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 967 (1976)).
79. Id. There is much criticism of the United States Supreme Court's per curiam opin-
ion in Bush H on the ground that it contains a statement that might be read to mean that
the decision applies only to this case and that it is not meant to work as a precedent. See,
e.g., David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking, in THE VOTE, BUSH, GORE,
AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 184, 197-99. But the four Florida justices' opin-
ion, as ChiefJustice Wells points out, cannot be meant to govern future Florida elections: it
is an unwieldy, unworkable approach designed for one-time use. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at
1268-69 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
80. Harris 11, 772 So. 2d at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
81. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1431 (2001); see also Klarman, supra note 59, at 1746-47 (indicating that ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas normally would have given deference to a state
court, and suggesting that their failure to do so in this instance may have resulted from
their feeling that the Florida Supreme Court had deprived Bush of his victory).
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less payment of respect. Justice Hugo Black once wrote that federal
courts owe "a proper respect for state functions," a respect grounded
in the idea that "the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways." 2 He cautioned that "proper respect" is not
"blind deference to 'States' Rights.' 8 8 Federalism-based deference
has never been absolute, despite what some of the Court's critics seem
to believe. That deference has been crafted to give state institutions
the incentive to carry out their separate functions well and has pro-
vided for intrusions where their autonomy does not function in the
federal interest.8 4
To the extent that the Florida Supreme Court itself departed
from the usual constraints of deference to other state institutions, it
provoked the higher degree of scrutiny it received from the United
States Supreme Court. But even if the United States Supreme Court
had not taken the case, the boldness of the Florida Supreme Court
had already lit a fire under the state legislature, which was preparing
to appoint its own rival slate of electors if the mechanisms of state
court litigation had led to a slate of electors for Gore, 5 and Congress
would have had the final say,86 if the United States Supreme Court
had not intervened, about which Florida electoral votes to use. The
state court thus could never have commanded utter deference
through the means of its authority over state law. Many other institu-
tions were keeping an eye on its machinations.
B. The Problem of the Statutory Standard: "Clear Indication of the Intent
of the Voter"
Even as it seemed to ignore the remanded Bush Icase, the Florida
Supreme Court, in the Bush II phase of the litigation, revealed that it
had absorbed the message of Bush I quite well. The four justices in
82. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (emphasis added). Younger, which was
the first case in the post-Warren Era development of federalism, required federal courts to
abstain from enjoining ongoing state court proceedings. It is discussed in more detail,
supra note 63.
83. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
84. SeeJustice Sandra Day O'Connor, OurJudicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1,
8 (1984) (assuring federal court respect for state court rulings as long as state courts prop-
erly respect federal law).
85. See DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 229-30 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,
Order Without Law, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at
205, 217 (concluding that the Florida legislature "almost certainly" would have sent its own
slate of electors in favor of Bush to the Electoral College had the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Bush 1).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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the state court's majority opinion began their discussion of the "Appli-
cable Law" with Article II's clause granting authority to the state legis-
latures, and a simple, declarative sentence: "These statutes established
by the Legislature govern our decision today."87 The four justices also
made what would turn out to be a crucial interpretation of the state
legislature's intent: "We consider these statutes cognizant of the fed-
eral grant of authority derived from the United States Constitution
and derived from 3 U.S.C. § 5 . *."..88 That is, the state legislature
meant to fit into the federal statute's safe harbor.
Counting all the votes was still important-a "paramount" con-
cern-but now a concern embedded in the state's statutes.8" The four
Florida justices stressed the many statutory provisions that reflected
the legislature's intent to provide for accurate vote counting.90 In
overturning the trial judge's verdict and ordering the astonishing
remedy of a statewide recount to begin immediately,9 the majority
seemed deliberately to avoid creating the basis for the United States
Supreme Court to reverse on the Article II ground. This is all about
what the legislature intended, the Florida Supreme Court opinion
proclaims: the statutes, though they are meant to take advantage of
the federal safe harbor, place the greatest importance on discerning
the "will of the voter." 2 The statutory principle "that the outcome of
elections be determined by the will of the voters" made it "absolutely
essential" to conduct a manual recount wherever there was "a concern
that not every citizen's vote was counted," which meant in every
county where the machines read ballots as containing no vote. 3 As
the four justices put it: "The clear message from this legislative policy
is that every citizen's vote be counted whenever possible, whether in
an election for a local commissioner or an election for President of
the United States.
9 4
Despite the abundant reliance on the state statute throughout
the state justices' opinion, it still contains one reference to the state
87. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
88. Id.
89. Id. The four justices referred to the statutory law and its own cases interpreting
statutory law that make "the intent of the voter" a "paramount concern" that "should al-
ways be given effect if the intent can be determined." Id. at 1256.
90. See id. at 1248-52 (noting state statutory provisions and legislative history regarding
the importance of accurate vote counts, the use of the courts in procedures for contesting
election, and the recounting of votes).
91. Id. at 1262.
92. Id. at 1253.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1254.
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constitution. That reference appears within a long quote from an old
case:
[T]he real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but
in realistic terms, are the voters. They are possessed of the
ultimate interest and it is they whom we must give primary
consideration. The contestants have direct interests cer-
tainly, but the office they seek is one of high public service
and of utmost importance to the people, thus subordinating
their interests to that of the people. Ours is a government
of, by and for the people. Our federal and state constitu-
tions guarantee the right of the people to take an active part
in the process of that government, which for most of our citi-
zens means participation via the election process. The right
to vote is the right to participate; it is also the right to speak,
but more importantly the right to be heard.95
This quote is offered to support ordering a statewide recount even
though no party had requested that relief.96 This same quote was
used by the Florida Supreme Court in its protest stage case, although
when it was used there, it went on for two more sentences:
We must tread carefully on that right or we risk the unneces-
sary and unjustified muting of the public voice. By refusing
to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citi-
zen to vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to
statutory scripture, we would in effect nullify that right.97
After Bush I, Article II-inspired faith in "statutory scripture" had re-
bounded. The Florida majority now found the voter rights it needed
in the lines of the newly revered statutory text. Now, the abridged
version of the quote would suffice. One might contend that if the
Florida Supreme Court really wanted to insulate itself completely with
statutory interpretation, it would have jettisoned the entire quote,
with its reference to the state constitution, and its potential to stir up
memories of its recent disparagement of mere statutory law. But the
new use of the old quote works to explain that its previous opinion
really is a statutory opinion. Immediately following the abridged ver-
sion of the quote in its new decision are these statements:
95. Id. (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)) (emphasis
added).
96. Id. Note, however, that Bush had relied on the argument that it was unfair to pick
only the counties favorable to Gore. TooBrN, supra note 68, at 232.
97. HarrisI, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Boardman, 323 So.
2d at 263).
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For example, the Legislature has mandated that no vote shall
be ignored "if there is a clear indication of the intent of the
voter" on the ballot, unless it is "impossible to determine the
elector's choice." § 101.5614(5)-(6) Fla. Stat. (2000). Section
102.166(7), Florida Statutes (2000), also provides that the focus
of any manual examination of a ballot shall be to determine
the voter's intent. The clear message from this legislative pol-
icy is that every citizen's vote be counted whenever possible,
whether in an election for a local commissioner or an elec-
tion for President of the United States.98
The legislature has now embodied those great ideals, so necessary to
the decision, within the statutory law. The statutory law is no longer
the enemy to be resisted with the superior hierarchical force of the
state constitution; it is now the ally, necessary to fending off the real
threat, United States Supreme Court review.
ChiefJustice Wells rejected the four justices' opinion as a concoc-
tion with "no foundation in the law of Florida as it existed on Novem-
ber 7, 2000, or at any time until the issuance of this opinion."9 They
had unleashed a recount with "unknown or, at best, ambiguous stan-
dards" to be done by persons whose "credentials, qualifications, and
objectivity" were "totally unknown."' 00 Their arguments for the amaz-
ing statewide recount of all ballots the machine had rejected because
it detected no vote ("undervotes"), should, according to Wells, equally
require a manual recount of the ballots the machine rejected because
it detected more than one vote ("overvotes"), so the remedy address-
ing only the undervotes must be wrong.1'° The majority's reliance on
the statutory language "clear indication of the intent of the voter," 102
Chief Justice Wells noted, should run afoul of equal protection re-
quirements. 10 3 It was especially bad to avoid answering the question
whether to count "dimpled chads," the question the county boards
had conspicuously disagreed about;10 4 to ask these boards now to con-
duct a recount under their inconsistent standards was patently unfair
to the voters in the counties that used the stricter standard.10 5 The
court could not resolve this question without making new law because
the statute gave authority only to the local boards to decide on "the
98. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1254 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id at 1264 n.26.
102. See id. at 1262 (per curiam).





clear indication of the intent of the voter."1 0 6 Because it would be
new law, a more particular standard would violate Article 11.107 Not to
set a more particular standard, however, would violate equal protec-
tion."' In Wells's eyes, the Florida Court was cornered: if we override
the statutes, we'll be reversed on Article II grounds; if we use the stat-
utes, we'll be reversed on equal protection grounds.10 9 The conclu-
sion was clear to Chief Justice Wells: no attempt at insulating the state
court opinion with state law will work; and we ought not to bring our-
selves into disrepute by trying to avoid the inevitable.
C. The Problem of the December 12 Deadline
The four Floridajustices in the majority made a key concession as
they marshaled the evidence of legislative intent to support the new
recount. They had written at the outset of their discussion that the
legislature meant to fit into the federal safe harbor, and the safe har-
bor provision included the December 12 deadline for completing all
of the procedures for appointing the electors.'1 0 Bush had argued
that the need to meet this deadline ought to cause the court to inter-
pret the state statutory scheme to exclude the contest phase entirely in
the case of presidential elections."1 ' The four justices' rejection of
this interpretation reads as follows:
[T]he Legislature has prescribed a single election scheme
for local, state and federal elections. The Legislature has
not, beyond granting to Florida's voters the right to select
presidential electors, indicated in any way that it intended
that a different (and unstated) set of election rules should
apply to the selection of presidential electors. Of course, be-
cause the selection and participation of Florida's electors in
the presidential election process is subject to a stringent cal-
endar controlled by federal law, the Florida election law scheme
must yield in the event of a conflict.1 12
106. Id. at 1267-68.
107. Id at 1268.
108. Id at 1267.
109. Id. at 1267-68. Chief Justice Wells also faulted the majority for not balancing the
relief to be provided by the remedy against the injury the relief itself produces. Id at 1269-
70. Here, the "confusion and disorder" produced by the recount were a serious injury
overshadowing the dubious benefits of the remedy. Id. at 1269 (quoting Florida ex rel.
Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736, 738-39 (Fla. 1936)). Justice Harding, who also dissented,
emphasized this point as well, noting that the recount itself, a supposed benefit, would
only increase the amount of uncertainty and chaos. Id. at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 1248 (per curiam).
111. Id. at 1249 n.7.
112. Id. at 1253 n.11 (emphasis added).
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Thus, in the process of deflecting Bush's argument that the presiden-
tial election should be read out of part of the statutory scheme, the
Florida Supreme Court majority read into the statutes the very pro-
position that the United States Supreme Court would rely on to end
the recount on the night of December 12: the state law procedures
"must yield' to the federal deadline. "Of course"!
The four justices relegated this point to a footnote-Footnote 11.
Placement in a footnote may indicate that the court thought very little
about the proposition, but it may also indicate that the conclusion was
too obvious to require saying in the text. The phrase "Of course" sug-
gests the latter interpretation. Moreover, if the court thought very lit-
tle about the conclusion, its spontaneity may have lowered its
defenses. Though elsewhere the majority took care to construct an
opinion impervious to interference by the United States Supreme
Court, here it unwittingly deposited a useful nugget conceding the
ground that would prove crucial as the United States Supreme Court
ultimately ended the case without seeing further need for state court
interpretation of state law. 113
Elsewhere in the opinion, the four justices acknowledged the im-
minent deadline. They "recognize[d] that time is desperately
short.""' 4 The dissenting justices had criticized the majority for not
weighing the harms caused by the relief-the danger of chaos-
against the benefits, which were to them meager.' 15 The four justices,
in response, only criticized the dissenters for being too concerned
with "looming deadlines and practical difficulties." '11 6 This was not a
disagreement about whether the deadlines were real, but an assertion
that it is important to try to accomplish the recount despite the admit-
ted time pressure. The four justices even "agree [d] that practical dif-
ficulties may well end up controlling the outcome of the election."" 7
113. The material in the Florida Supreme Court opinion relating to the deadline is rich,
yet the United States Supreme Court, which assumed the December 12 deadline, did not
exploit this material, even though to do so would have deflected the criticism that it was
arrogating to itself a power to decide a question of state law. See infta text accompanying
notes 191-206.
114. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1261 (per curiam). The majority also stated:
[T]he need for accuracy must be weighed against the need for finality. The need
for prompt resolution and finality is especially critical in presidential elections
where there is an outside deadline established by federal law. Notwithstanding,
consistent with the legislative mandate and our precedent, although the time con-
straints are limited, we must do everything required by law to ensure that legal
votes that have not been counted are included in the final election results.
Id.
115. See supra note 109.
116. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1261 n.21 (per curiam).
117. Id. at 1262 n.21.
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Although many commentators and, as we shall see, United States Su-
preme Court Justices viewed some other deadline as the true dead-
line, i" 8 the Florida court's opinion does not leave an open question
about which deadline controls the operation of the state statutory
scheme. The deadline, as a matter of state law interpreted by the
state's highest court, is the date on the "stringent calendar controlled
by federal law," '19 i.e., December 12.
Conceding that the December 12 deadline must control was not
necessary to the four justices' opinion or required to accomplish the
goal, which we might want to attribute to them, of relying entirely on
statutory law. The majority could have left open the question what the
legislature would intend in the event of a conflict between ongoing
state procedures and the federal deadline; perhaps the legislature's
supposed dedication to counting every vote 21 surpassed its interest in
meeting the safe harbor. Naturally, it would not make sense to inter-
pret legislative intent to demand vote counting to continue so long as
to prevent the inclusion of Florida's share of the electoral vote in the
final count presented to Congress, but one could allow it to continue
until December 18,121 the day when the Electoral College would meet,
or even January 6,122 the day when Congress would count the votes.'1 2
The Florida Supreme Court might have gone that far and still been
able to claim that it was all a matter of state statutory interpretation,
118. See Klarman, supra note 59, at 1745 (suggesting that it would have been appropriate
to allow the recount to proceed past December 12 as long as it was completed by Decem-
ber 18t the time when electors had to be appointed for the electoral college); Scheppele,
supra note 3, at 1427 (maintaining that the December 12 date did not need to be the
Florida deadline because other states had previously waited much longer to appoint elec-
tors); infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's and Justice
Breyer's views on the proper deadline).
119. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1254 n.l (per curiam).
120. "Count all the votes" was the mantra of Gore's post-election effort, repeated so
often that it worked as a practical joke for George W. Bush to telephone one of his aides
and say: 'You know what we ought to do, Joe? . . . We ought to count all the votes ...
Come on. You call Gore up and work it out. Let's count all the votes .... C'mon. Let's
count all the votes. Count all the votes." TOOBIN, supra note 68, at 94.
121. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 98, 146 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court should remand the case to the Florida courts to determine whether time remained
to conduct a recount by December 18).
122. See id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the December 12 deadline
does not have "ultimate significance" because Congress does not determine "the validity of
electoral votes" until January 6).
123. After the 1960 election, Congress accepted a slate of electors from Hawaii that had
been appointed on January 4. See id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course, Hawaii's
electoral votes did not determine the outcome of that election, but the acceptance of Ha-
waii's votes does stand as a precedent that would have been used in an argument that
Congress must accept late-counted votes from Florida after the 2000 election. See Schep-
pele, supra note 3, at 1427 n.176.
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about which its word is the last word, thus frustrating any later efforts
of the United States Supreme Court to get a federal law grip on the
dispute.
The majority also might have responded to Bush's argument for
excluding the contest phase by simply concluding that the legislature
bungled the matter of presidential elections. The Florida Supreme
Court could have asserted that the state legislature, in composing the
statutory scheme, thought of the recount procedures only in the con-
text of the sort of local and state elections that normally rely on them,
because it did not envision the state ever playing a crucial role in a
presidential election. That eminently understandable lack of imagina-
tion on the part of the legislature unfortunately left the presidential
election subject to many admittedly unsuitable state procedures, yet
nothing could be done about it. Indeed, to adjust the procedures to
avoid missing the deadline would be to create a new scheme after the
election and would itself risk the loss of the safe harbor! The legisla-
ture wanted to meet the safe harbor, but it failed, and that is what
state law is-in the eyes of the Florida Supreme Court.
If the Florida majority had wanted only, by whatever way possible,
to hand victory to Al Gore, it might have considered an interpretation
of state statutory law that would break all the federal deadlines. With
Florida's votes excluded from the Electoral College, Al Gore would
have had a majority of the votes cast. 124 That the court did not go this
far, however, ought not to encourage those who hope to salvage the
Florida Supreme Court's reputation for neutrality because it is highly
unlikely that Congress, which would have controlled the final decision
with respect to whether Florida's votes counted, would have allowed
Gore to win that way, because the ultimate presidential choice in a
conflict would have fallen to the House of Representatives, voting by
state, which would have given control to the Republican party.125 Ei-
ther they would have accepted the electors appointed by the certified
vote count from November 26,126 or they would have accepted the
124. See Rhodes Cook, This Just In: Nixon Beats Kennedy, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2001, at
B2 (stating the final Electoral College totals as 271 votes for Bush and 266 votes for Gore).
125. See ToOBIN, supra note 68, at 206 (noting that "should it be necessary, the Republi-
cans apparently had the votes in the United States Congress to settle the election once and
for all").
126. The Florida Supreme Court might have ordered Secretary Harris to retrieve the
November 26 certification and barred her from filing a new one at any time. Yet she might
not have obeyed that order. Even if she had, Congress would have had the role of inter-
preting the meaning of a majority of the votes cast and decided Vice President Gore
needed a majority of a total that included the Florida votes, in which case he would have
had more votes than Governor Bush, but not the needed majority.
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appointment of Bush electors that the Florida legislature would have
made if the recount procedure had led to a Gore victory. 12 7 Moreo-
ver, the more vigorous the effort by the Florida Supreme Court, the
more likely the United States Supreme Court would have been to step
in.
So does the concession in Footnote 11 support the theory that
the Florida Supreme Court did not deviate from judicial orthodoxy,
that it was not on an illegitimate mission to thwart United States Su-
preme Court review? It seems more likely that the Florida Supreme
Court had many loose ends to tie together and very little time to do it,
and never anticipated that Footnote 11 was ceding so much power to
the higher court. The Florida court, indeed, ought not to have tied
up every loose end, one can say now in retrospect, if it had wanted to
preserve its control over the outcome, because leaving a loose end of
uninterpreted state law might have convinced one more Justice to sup-
port the remand that Justices Breyer and Souter proposed,' which
would have changed the outcome in Bush I
III. A STAY SUPPORTED BY A CLOUD
The Florida Supreme Court's unanimity, seen in its first decision,
had broken down. Now, the United States Supreme Court's unanim-
ity would fall apart too. I doubt that the United States Supreme Court
would have acted differently if the Florida Supreme Court had been
able to maintain a united front and issued an opinion that gave every
appearance of being an unimpeachably legalistic exposition of state
statutory law. Surely, the United States Supreme Court Justices who
reversed the Florida Supreme Court were scrutinizing the work of the
Florida Supreme Court with a very sharp eye and have no trouble per-
ceiving the ways state court judges write about state law to try to avoid
Supreme Court review. But the dissenting state court opinions ac-
tively invited review and begged for the majority's work to be looked
at with great suspicion. 29
127. See TOOBIN, supra note 68, at 138-39 (stating that the Florida legislature had the
power to instruct its electors how to vote in the Electoral College and "could simply vote to
give the election to Bush").
128. See Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 134-35 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
equal protection issues raised by the petitioner's challenge to the ordered recount could
be resolved by a remand conditioned upon establishing a uniform standard).
129. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority opinion "cannot withstand the scrutiny which will certainly immediately follow
under the United States Constitution").
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The United States Supreme Court's unanimity broke in half
upon the granting of a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's order.'
Just hours after the recount had begun on December 9, the United
States Supreme Court stopped it,1 3' and the next three days were then
consumed with the briefing and arguing of the case and the day-and-a-
half wait for the Court's opinion. 31 On the night of the 12th, the last
day left for qualifying for safe-harbor treatment, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the method used for the full-state recount vio-
lated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, and, because a
constitutional recount could obviously not be carried out by midnight,
the case had come to a close.
33
It no longer matters to the outcome that the stay was granted
because any counting that had been done pending the issuance of the
United States Supreme Court's opinion would not have been usable,
but those interested in the legitimacy of the Court's actions still have
good reason to examine the stay. It turned out to be true that any
counting accomplished prior to the Bush II decision would not have
been usable, but at the time the stay was granted, this uselessness
could only have been known if the majority had already reached its
decision on the merits.13 1 One might very well argue that the few days
left until the deadline should have been used to go forward with the
count the Florida Supreme Court had ordered because in the event
that it were found constitutional, the count might have been com-
pleted in time to meet the December 12 deadline. If it turned out not
to be seen as a constitutional procedure (as it did), then the count
could simply have been tossed out. So if there was a chance of achiev-
ing the benefit of accomplishing a recount within the deadline, this
argument goes, it should have been pursued. What good was
achieved by giving up that chance, and what harm would going for-
ward have done that could not have been remedied by throwing out
the count? In other words, how did Bush satisfy the requirement of
"irreparable injury"'35 for a stay? Indeed, did the stay not threaten an
130. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
131. Id.
132. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 100 (per curiam).
133. Id. at 110.
134. See Richard A Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Dead-
lock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 23 (suggesting that Bush II may have
been a case of 'judgment in advance of doctrine"-judges having a general sense of how
they think the case should come out before deciding on appropriate legal principles).
135. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 (1994) (Souter, CircuitJus-




irreparable injury to Gore? The stay looked like an additional, illegiti-
mate way to promote victory for Bush: run out the clock.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissented from the grant of the stay.' 36 They criticized the majority
for "depart[ing]" from the "venerable rules of judicial restraint." '137
This dissenting opinion set the tone for much of the criticism of the
Court that would follow: the conservatives have violated their own
credo of restraint!138 Justice Stevens's first rule of restraint-"re-
spect[ ]" state court opinions of state law-need not be considered a
rule of restraint at all. State courts are the authoritative expositors of
state law.'13  The United States Supreme Court does not "defer" to
their interpretations, it simply recognizes the state court's author-
ity. 140 It is not a process of standing back and judging the state court's
work by a special lenient standard, as with abuse of discretion review.
Indeed, the state court could make a ridiculous interpretation of state
law and that would be state law; it might raise questions of federal law,
such as the violation of constitutional rights, 141 but the interpretation
provided by the state courts is authoritative. Justice Stevens's second
rule of restraint requires the United States Supreme Court to use a
narrow interpretation of its own jurisdiction and to exercise any juris-
diction that it does find "cautiously" when it faces issues "committed at
least in large measure to another branch of the Federal Govern-
ment.' 4 2 Presumably, he intended to refer to the constitutional role
136. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000, at 186 (2001) (discussing how the Supreme Court's decision to grant a stay
and then permanently to stop the count "has been widely perceived as so inconsistent with
the alleged conservative approach to judging-judicial restraint"). Many commentators,
however, have suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush Ilwas consistent with a
recent trend toward conservative judicial activism. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise.
It's an Activist Court, in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY, supra note
3, at 273, 273-74.
139. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. But see Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (acknowledg-
ing that "comity and respect for federalism . . .compel . . .defer[ence]" to state court
decisions based on state law).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
142. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contrast this approach with Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), a case brought to force
the Internal Revenue Service to adopt a more aggressive approach toward denying tax
exemptions to private schools that impede public school desegregation. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, had taken the position that separation of powers should affect the
analysis of whether the requirements for standing have been met. Id. at 750. In Allen, this
meant that the Court took a hard look at whether the IRS's policy caused the plaintiffs'
injury (lack of public school integration). Id. at 751. Concern about allowing the IRS a
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provided for Congress at a much later stage. The third rule of re-
straint is that the Court "prudently decline [s]" cases that do not "fairly
present" federal constitutional questions.' 43 As discussed in Part I of
this Article, this notion does not square with Michigan v. Long,'44
which set up a doctrine designed to resist efforts of state supreme
courts to avoid review by muddling the presentation of issues.' 4 5 Jus-
tice Stevens, it may help to note, was the lone dissenter from this as-
pect of Long, he alone argued for respecting the autonomy of a state
court that had mixed up its interpretation of state and federal law. 146
Justice Stevens did not elaborate on why the stay violated the
"venerable rules of judicial restraint." "' He concentrated instead on
Bush's failure to make the showing required for a stay: irreparable
harm and the likelihood of success on the merits.1 48 The only poten-
tial harm he perceived was in suppressing the recount, which he wrote
will "cast a cloud on the legitimacy of the election."' 49 Most of his
discussion addressed the likelihood of success on the merits; he sum-
marized the Florida Supreme Court's discussion of state statutory law,
cited many Florida cases that favor counting every vote, and noted:
"As a more fundamental matter, the Florida court's ruling reflects the
basic principle, inherent in our Constitution and our democracy, that
every legal vote should be counted."15
This dissenting opinion provoked Justice Scalia to write his own
separate opinion justifying the stay. 1 He noted, without saying why,
fair range of discretion in determining how to enforce federal law affected the Court's
conclusion that the injury was not "fairly traceable" to the policy. Id. at 757. Justice Stevens
dissented in that case and expressed puzzlement about why separation of powers concerns
should influence standing doctrine. Id. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Ste-
vens's invocation of this "venerable rule" of judicial restraint does not seem to be an ex-
pression of his own jurisprudence, but rather an attempt to hold the conservative side of
the Court to principles it has on previous occasions expressed.
143. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 39-48.
145. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
146. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also wrote a dissenting opin-
ion, joined by Justice Marshall, but this opinion rejected the substantive ground, not the
jurisdictional ground. Id. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. Justice Stevens's opinion does not clearly state that the requirements for a stay
include not only irreparable injury but also a likelihood of success on the merits. But see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 (1994) (Souter, CircuitJustice) (listing
as a requirement for the granting of a stay "a fair prospect that the applicant will ultimately
prevail on the merits").
149. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544-55 (1964)).
151. Id. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that "the issuance of the stay suggests that a majority of the Court,
while not deciding the issues presented, believe that the petitioner has
a substantial probability of success." '5 2 Some of the Court's critics
have jumped on this statement as if it revealed an outrageous
prejudice, 53 but it simply responded to justice Stevens's discussion of
the "likelihood of success" requirement. The grant of the stay itself
implied that the Court believed there was a "likelihood of success,"
and Justice Scalia, if anything, should be credited with resisting laying
out the flaws he perceived in the paragraph of Justice Stevens's opin-
ion that vaunted the correctness of the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion.
Justice Scalia did go on to explain what he saw as the irreparable
injury in the recounting process:
The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does
in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and
to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be
the legitimacy of his election. Count first, and rule upon le-
gality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election re-
sults that have the public acceptance democratic stability
requires.'
54
Thus, both Justices expressed concern about a possible "cloud" on the
"legitimacy of the election"-the cloud came either from counting or
not counting. Justice Scalia's cloud was the cloud on Bush's presi-
dency that would remain if the public were to hear the results of a
recount favoring Gore. Even if the votes were not used to change the
152. Id. This conclusion is repeated in Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam)
("Given the Court's assessment that the recount process underway was probably being con-
ducted in an unconstitutional manner, the Court stayed the order directing the recount so
it could hear this case and render an expedited decision.").
153. For example, Jeffrey Toobin characterized this statement as showing "the kind of
swagger that was characteristic of the Republicans throughout the recount," and meaning
"in other words . . . that (Scalia's] side already had the game locked up." TOOBIN, supra
note 68, at 250. In fact, it is soundly established that likelihood of success is a requirement
for granting a stay, so that the grant of a stay always means the Court has prejudged the
merits, a simple legal matter Toobin never mentioned, even as he accused Justice Scalia's
opinion of "suggest[ing] a remarkably political view of the Court's role." Id. at 251. Inter-
estingly, Toobin went on to quote the BlackBerry message Gore sent his spokesmen imme-
diately after the stay was granted: "PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT NO ONE TRASHES THE SUPREME
COURT." Id. at 252. Toobin, who was critical of Gore throughout his book for not trying
hard enough to win, followed Gore's message with a contrasting statement purportedly
"muttered" by President Clinton, "The Supreme Court . . . Gore ought to attack those
bastards." Id.
154. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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result of the election, the votes would cause people to think ill of
those results.1
55
Was that enough of an injury in contrast to the harm in not
counting? Those who are familiar with Justice Scalia's strict position
on Article III standing doctrine, with its injury requirement, may find
something amiss: he is the least likely of all the Justices to take the
position that a plaintiff in a federal case has met the standing require-
ment of a "concrete and particularized injury," '156 so why should he be
among the first to find an injury here?157 To read justice Scalia's find-
ing injury in what he himself labels a "cloud" makes one wonder about
all the standing cases in which he has staunchly resisted finding inju-
ries that arose out of mere feelings. For example, in the recent case of
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Justice Scalia dis-
sented,joined only by Justice Thomas, criticizing the majority for find-
ing sufficient injury in the plaintiffs' mere "'concern' that the water
was polluted" and simple "belie [f] " that their property values had de-
clined. 5 So are feelings and impressions really judicially cognizable
injuries or not? Moreover, in Bush v. Gore, the injury was not even the
feelings of the applicant for the stay, but in how others would feel about
him. Why should the Court concern itself with the way the recount
might affect the mental state of the American people? Should the
Court worry about the loss of political clout that might hurt Bush if he
becomes President under a "cloud" of opinion resulting from an im-
proper, unused recount in Florida? There is, theoretically, a loss of
political power; but consider Raines v. Byrd, 59 a 1997 case, joined by
Justice Scalia, that held that members of Congress lacked standing to
challenge the Line Item Veto Act. The mere loss of political power
asserted by those plaintiffs was not enough to meet the requirements
for standing. 6 ° The power lost by a member of Congress jockeying
for his pet item when the President might target it for veto had more
155. As Professor Michael McConnell has noted, the Court would have needed to re-
quire the destruction of the ballots to avoid this harm, which could have resulted from a
recount occurring later. McConnell, supra note 57, at 98-99.
156. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167,
201 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for "mak[ing] the injury-in-fact
requirement a sham" when it accepted "vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allega-
tions of 'concern"' about the pollution of a river).
157. The Court has in the past equated the injury required for standing with the irrepa-
rable injury required for equitable relief. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499
(1974).
158. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
160. Id. at 829.
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substance than the mere attitude people might have about Bush if
they thought the election had been mishandled.' 6 '
Justice Scalia also worried that if in fact the current count were
illegal, the next count would be less accurate, "since it is generally
agreed that each manual recount produces a degradation of the bal-
lots."' 6 2 Of course, if the Court were already planning to enforce the
December 12 deadline, then it knew there could be no usable second
recount. Thus, the choice was between the current recount and no
recount at all, and the only interest in preserving the ballots would be
to obtain an accurate count, for information only, after the results of
the election had been determined.
The granting of the stay, as a matter ofjudicial orthodoxy, seems
to be the most questionable part of everything the United States Su-
preme Court did in the Bush-Gore litigation. It does not seem to have
been treated like just another application for a stay. It can perhaps be
justified as a truly unique case. The sudden and extravagant decision
of the Florida Supreme Court, so late in the process, after people had
come to believe that the post-election uncertainty had reached an
end, had produced tremendous excitement. 6 3 The soaring, resur-
rected hopes of Gore supporters were matched by the outrage and
alarm felt by Bush supporters.164 The manual counting that had gone
on up to this point had been strange and disorderly enough, but the
new counting was much larger in scope than any that had gone on
before, and it was taking place with a new and extreme degree of time
pressure.165 In this context, one can understand how the majority
may have felt that the Florida Supreme Court really deserved the re-
sponse it got: someone needed to step in and announce that adults
are here and will not tolerate this disarray for another moment. In
judicial terms, that translated into a stay.
Even if this unique case did not satisfy the most formal approach
to finding the elements necessary for a stay, it may be said to do ex-
actly what a stay is meant to do: provide stability. Gore and Bush sup-
161. Indeed, to some extent, Bush did take office with that cloud over his head. Yet his
conduct as President and the polls of public opinion did not seem to evince any serious
injury from the usual election. See Talk of the Nation: How Americans View the Supreme Court,
supra note 56 (noting that early polls rated approval for President Bush at 57%, approxi-
mately the same rating received by Bill Clinton at the same point in his first term).
162. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. See David Von Drehle et al., In a Dark Hour, a Last-Minute Reprieve: Florida's High
Court Revived Recount-and the Prospects of a Bush Argument, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al.
164. See id.
165. See Harris 1, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261 (Fla. 2000) (noting that the manual recount
should proceed despite the time pressures resulting from the federal election law
deadline).
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porters cannot help thinking differently about this idea because they
will inevitably have different perceptions about just how chaotic and
unstable the situation in Florida was. But this difference in percep-
tion shows why the 5-4 vote of the Justices, which looked so much like
blatant voting for one's favorite candidate, might not deserve the de-
gree of criticism it provoked. If, as a legal matter, a stay is appropriate
to control an out-of-control situation, then those who perceived such a
situation could legitimately vote for the stay, and those who did not
could legitimately dissent. We might still want to criticize the Justices
for failing to make a sufficiently neutral judgment about the degree of
disorder that was present: the conservative-liberal split showed that a
lofty state of disinterestedness had not been achieved. Yet we need
not go so far as to accuse them of making a purely political decision.
In any event, if the Court departed from the highest ideals of the rule
of law at this point, it does not seem possible to conclude that only the
majority went astray. All of the Justices were attempting to make a
legitimate judicial decision, I would guess, but the emotional compo-
nent of their necessarily human reasoning affected how chaotic and
destabilizing they perceived the Florida recount to be and conse-
quently how they analyzed the need for the stay.
IV. DID THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT USURP THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT'S AUTHORITY OVER STATE LAW IN BUSH I1?
A. Equal Protection Analysis
1. The Per Curiam Opinion Finds a Violation of Equal Protection and
Ends the Recount.-The Court delivered its fractured opinion on the
night of December 12.166 The per curiam opinion avoided dealing
with the Article II question altogether and rested entirely, if shakily,
on the equal protection ground. 167 According to the Court, once a
state legislature has decided to use voting as the method of appointing
the presidential electors, the right to vote becomes "fundamental,"
and subject to the Equal Protection Clause's requirement that each
person's vote receive equal weight, 6 even though the state can take
back its power of appointment "at any time."16 Citing cases from the
1960s, the Court wrote that the state may not "debase[I] or
dilut[e]" 170 a person's vote through "arbitrary and disparate treat-
166. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 110.
168. Id. at 104.
169. Id. The Court here reaffirmed the position taken in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S.
1, 35 (1892).
170. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
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ment." ' t The Court recognized the irony that both parties relied on
this principle: Gore saw it as the reason to do the very counting that
Bush saw it as the reason to stop.
172
The Court held that the counting failed to meet the "minimum
requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure
the fundamental right."' 73 The Florida Supreme Court's standard-
"intent of the voter"-was too abstract. At a minimum, there should
have been a uniform standard for dealing with the "recurring circum-
stances."' 74 It was intolerable, according to the Court, to rely on such
a general rule when it was well known that different counties and even
different counting teams were coming up with different answers to
recurrent questions, such as whether "dimpled chads" should
count.'7 5 The Court also found it arbitrary that some of the re-
counted votes that the Florida Supreme Court included in the state
total came from counties that had examined all of the ballots that the
machines had left uncounted, both undervotes and overvotes, while
the new recounting process was limited to undervote ballots. 176 Then
there was the little-noticed problem of the ballot that contains two
marks, each showing the "intent of the voter," thus making it an
overvote, that actually was counted because the machine had only rec-
ognized one of the two marks. 17 7 Why did that vote count when other
overvotes did not? As to all of these problems, everything other than
the failure to resolve the recurring question about the standard for
marking the ballots, the Court did not say that they fell below the
minimum requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, only that they
"exemplifie[d] concerns with the remedial processes." 17' The Court
raised "further concerns" about who would do the recounts and how
objections would be made. 17 One might criticize the Court for pro-
ducing such a rambling list of "concerns" without specifying exactly
whether they violated the Equal Protection Clause because the power
of the United States Supreme Court over the Florida Supreme Court
had to flow from the violation of federal law. Yet the Court had its
rights violation: not setting a specific standard for the known, recur-
171. Id. at 104 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
172. Id. at 105.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 106. This is the problem identified by Chief Justice Wells in his dissenting
opinion below. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1267 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
175. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106 (per curiam).
176. Id. at 107-08.
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 109.
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ring situation. That one clear violation of federal law allowed it to
intrude on the Florida Supreme Court. The rest of the "concerns"
seemed to function only to support the Court's prediction that no
recount could possibly satisfy constitutional law.' 8°
The Court referred to "yet a further equal protection problem":
the Florida court had provided no "assurance" that the final count
would be complete.'' The Court interpreted the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion to "permit" the use of partial recounts in the event
that the attempted recount was incomplete because the Florida
court's opinion ordered the immediate inclusion of a partial recount
that had already occurred in Miami-Dade County and also recognized
that the recount might not be completed by the December 12 dead-
line.18 2 But that "problem" lay in the future, and, indeed the count-
ing, at the time it was stopped by the United States Supreme Court,
was on schedule to finish two days before the deadline. Why talk of
"problems" and "concerns" instead of real violations unless you are
trying to muddle, rather like the Michigan court in Michigan v.
Long""3 The Court nevertheless made assertions as to the necessity of
its role: it was "forced to confront" the case because of the presence of
federal questions, and its jurisdiction was not the result of an act of
will, but an "unsought responsibility."'
18 4
The Court summarized:
The recount process, in its features here described, is incon-
sistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect
the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of
a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judi-
cial officer. Our consideration is limited to the present cir-
cumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities.' 5
The Court showed very little concern for its own embarrassment
when, as it wrote an opinion criticizing the Florida Supreme Court for
putting together a supposedly messy and haphazard recount, it strung
together a rambling list of "concerns," with no specific analysis, made
a general conclusion that the whole enterprise could not be done well
180. See id. at 111.
181. Id. at 108.
182. Id.
183. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-61 (characterizing
Michigan v. Longs presumption as designed to deprive state supreme courts of the ability to
avoid review by muddling the issues of state and federal law).
184. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111 (per curiam).
185. Id. at 109.
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enough, and then tacked on a sentence calling attention to just how
ad hoc it thought equal protection analysis could be. What does this
passage mean? It seems to bunch together all the "concerns" and
"problems" and convert them, taken together, into a rights
violation. 1
86
It makes some sense to say that when a court conducts a recount
at the state level, it becomes practicable to have a uniform and coordi-
nated recount, and therefore the Equal Protection Clause imposes a
higher standard than what is required of executive officials who oper-
ate on a decentralized level. The Court did seem to rely on this idea:
The question before the Court is not whether local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different sys-
tems for implementing elections. Instead, we are presented
with a situation where a state court with the power to assure
uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal
procedural safeguards. When a court orders a statewide
remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the rudi-
mentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied.18 7
One should perhaps read the "limited to the present circumstances"
line to refer to a higher duty that comes into being in a centralized,
court-supervised recount, but there is no analysis of why disuniformity
becomes tolerable when it is squirreled away in the operations of the
County Boards of Elections. The suggestion seems to be that when it
is practicable-when there is judicial supervision of the whole opera-
tion-the Equal Protection Clause demands more responsibility for
avoiding arbitrariness, but there is so little explanation of why this is
so that many commentators feel no compunction to acknowledge this
level of coherence. The Court's failure to write in a doctrinal, struc-
tured fashion that makes for usable precedent and its explicit if enig-
matic warning not to use the case as precedent opened the Court up
to the criticism that it had no rational ground for what it did.18 8
186. This style of analysis, listing many considerations and then drawing a conclusion
based on the entire undifferentiated group, is not unique to Bush v. Gore. See, e.g., Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 836 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (relying on a multitude of
factors to draw a conclusion about whether the Establishment Clause had been violated).
187. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
188. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 138, at 81 (interpreting the Court's precedent-limiting
language to mean, "don't try to hold the Court to what it said in this case, because it
decided this case not on general principles applicable to all cases, but on a principle that
has never before been recognized by any court and that will never again be recognized by
this court").
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One might offer the excuse that the Court was pressed for time,
but if time pressure is an excuse for sloppy work, the Florida Supreme
Court ought to have gotten a pass as well. Moreover, the time pres-
sure may have let slip a usefully revealing statement. How do the Jus-
tices make their decisions? One may like to think that they work
through the legal reasons before deciding. If that is what is occurring,
then whenever a decision is reached, it should be a simple enough
matter to reveal those reasons in writing. If the reasons are generated
after the decision is made, however, time pressure permits that reality
to show. If time pressure forces the Justices to jot down their actual
thoughts, we the readers have the opportunity to see the real quality
of the ideas that went into the decision. One might compare the Bush
II per curiam opinion to the "excited utterance" exception to the
hearsay rule in evidence: it is the official policy of the federal courts to
consider a statement made spontaneously and under stress as more
reliable than a statement a person has had time to think through and
phrase carefully. 8 9 The reason is obvious: there is less risk that the
statement has been crafted to serve goals other than the truth. The
per curiam opinion gives us a rare opportunity to look at the real
content of a decision, precisely because there was so little time to craft
an opinion that would create the impression the Court has such a
great interest in conveying: that it is a truly disinterested, impeccably
legal, legitimate institution. 9 '
2. Justices Breyer and Souter's Proposal for a New Recount: The Elusive
True Deadline Problem.-The per curiam's equal protection analysis
gained credibility from the fact that two Justices from the liberal side
of the Court-Justices Souter and Breyer-agreed with it in part.
Both of these Justices thought that not setting a specific standard for
the known, recurring questions about particular types of ballot marks
rose to the level of an equal protection violation.19" ' Justice Breyer was
a bit vague about how to think about this rights violation in future
cases. It is only "in these very special circumstances" where there is so
much time pressure, where the recount was ordered by a central au-
thority, and where the decision-makers knew which standards helped
which candidate that the failure to provide a single standard violated
equal protection. 
9 2
189. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (excepting from the general rule against hearsay evidence
"[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition").
190. The work of the Florida Supreme Court provides us with another opportunity.
191. Bush 1I, 531 U.S. at 134 (SouterJ., dissenting); id. at 14546 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
192. Id. at 14546 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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Justices Breyer and Souter had a very substantial disagreement,
however, with the rest of the per curiam decision over what should be
done about the equal protection violation.1 93 The remaining mem-
bers of the per curiam majority-the five conservative Justices-took
the position that there was no time remaining for solving the equal
protection problems and conducting a constitutional recount. Not
only would substantial work need to be done to set up a proper proce-
dure,'94 but there was simply no time at all remaining for meeting the
safe harbor: it was already the night of December 12.' 9' Justice Souter
wrote that the Court should "take account of' the December 18 date
set for casting the electoral votes, which would leave six days.' 9 6 Yet
he gave no explanation why this extension would be justified in view
of the state court's interpretation that December 12th was the end of
the line.
Because the endpoint for the state's processes is itself a matter of
state statutory interpretation, 97 the Supreme Court would need to an-
swer a question of state law before it could move the endpoint to the
18th. The decision on that question of state law was avoidable
through a remand: one could have sent the case back to the state
court to make an interpretation of the date of the true deadline. The
193. Justice Souter also disagreed with the decision to take the case. He thought that,
left alone, the Florida Supreme Court might have dealt with the various equal protection
problems. Id. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting). If it had not, according to Justice Souter,
Congress could have addressed the problem. I at 129. Similarly, Justice Breyer thought
that the great national interest in the presidency was basically a political matter, which
could be resolved in the end by Congress as it performed its constitutional tasks relating to
the selection of the President. Id. at 153 (Breyer,J., dissenting). Injustice Breyer's view,
the legal issues in the case were insufficient to overcome principles ofjudicial restraint that
come into play when a court is faced with a "strange[ ]... intractab[le] ... momentous[ ]"
decision. Id. at 157 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184
(1962)). Even though the United States Supreme Court was also confronted with the work
of a state court that had also faced a "strange[ ] . . . intractab[le] . . . momentous[ ]"
decision and had gone ahead and decided it, according to Justice Breyer, the Court still
ought to worry about its own "unbalance [d] judicial judgment" and "the inner vulnerabil-
ity" arising from its lack of political accountability. Id. (quoting BICKEL, supra, at 185).
Justice Breyer took the position that issues involving fundamental rights are more worthy
of the Supreme Court's attention than the mere structural constitutional matters, such as
the one relied on by the ChiefJustice. Id. He did find one equal protection violation, and
admitted it involved "a basic human right," yet he thought it was not substantial enough for
the Court to risk exposure to the criticisms it would attract because Congress would be in a
position in the end to control the outcome of the election. Id. at 153.
194. Id. at 110 (per curiam). The Court noted in particular that the machines were not
designed to identify and sort out the unread undervotes and overvotes and would require
new software. Id
195. Id.
196. Id at 134-35 (Souter,J., dissenting).
197. No one took the position that 3 U.S.C. § 5 imposed the deadline. See supra note 16.
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Florida Supreme Court could have considered whether the state legis-
lature meant to elevate the acceptance of the offer of a safe harbor
over the interest in counting every vote. But didn't the Florida Su-
preme Court already commit itself to the December 12 deadline?198
Justice Souter entirely ignored that hitch. The Florida Supreme
Court's past creativity in support of recounting supplied good reason
to think that that court, given a chance to rethink the deadline issue,
would find a way to a new answer, but none of the Justices speculated
in writing on that subject.' 99 One might attribute the dearth of discus-
sion on the crucial issue of the deadline to the majority's unwilling-
ness to come out and say that the Florida Supreme Court could not be
trusted and the consequent lack of an opportunity for Justices Souter
and Breyer to take them to task for failing to trust the state court.
The per curiam opinion should be faulted for its failure to take a
clear position asserting that the Florida Supreme Court had estab-
lished December 12 as the deadline. Its silence made it possible for
Justice Souter merely to assert that there was "no justification for deny-
ing the State the opportunity to try to count all disputed ballots
now."200 Justice Souter's opinion should be faulted too, however, for
not admitting that he was giving the state courts a chance to change
the deadline or explaining why the state court should be given that
chance. He faulted the majority for not "tak[ing] account of' the De-
cember 18 date,2"1 but where is his account? It is not enough to float
the other date and not to explain why there is any reason to switch to
it, other than the desire for more time. Yet with no response from the
per curiam opinion on the problem, it is no wonder that he did not
attempt what would have been a difficult explanation.
Justice Breyer also found "no justification" for ending the case
without giving the Florida Supreme Court a chance to conduct a
proper recount. 20 2 He did concede that if December 12 was the dead-
line, "it is too late" as a matter of law, but if a later deadline applied,
he considered the question whether there was enough time a factual
198. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Florida
Supreme Court "acknowledged" that the state legislature took the federal safe harbor stat-
ute "into account").
199. After the United States Supreme Court's final remand to the Florida Supreme
Court, Justice Shaw revealed his willingness to rethink the deadline. See Gore v. Harris, 773
So. 2d 524, 528 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring) (stating that "December 12 was not a
'drop-dead' date under Florida law" and "question [ing] whether any date prior to January
6 is a drop-dead date under the Florida election scheme").
200. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 134.
202. Id. at 146 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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one that ought to be left to the state court. 20 3 He did say that the
equal protection "deficiency. . . could easily be remedied, ' 20 4 which is
quite a bit more sanguine than the majority's attitude, and he did find
fewer deficiencies than the majority,2 ° 5 but if the deadline were really
December 12, those differences would be irrelevant. Yet again, we
find no analysis of why December 12 was not the deadline. Like Jus-
tice Souter, he did not go back to the state court opinion and try to
demonstrate that it had left the issue open.
Justices Souter and Breyer's position depended on the openness
of the true deadline issue, yet they did not offer any discussion or
make any concession that the Florida Supreme Court seems to have
already resolved the issue. This failure makes their opinions as sus-
ceptible as all of the other opinions to the criticism that they were
constructed backwards from a desired outcome. Perhaps they were
not, and perhaps none of the others were either, but there is no rea-
son to place the Souter and Breyer opinions on a higher plane of
judicial orthodoxy than those written by the other members of the
Court. They too denied absolute respect to the state court's authority
over the interpretation of state law. While they may have avoided ex-
pressing disrespect for the state court by not discussing their disregard
of the state court's position on the deadline, to ignore the work of the
state court on this point of state law is also a form of disrespect. In a
sense it is worse than the supposed disrespect shown by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion, which found that the state court dis-
torted its interpretation of state law, 20 6 because no federal law basis
existed for ignoring the state court's state law interpretation that
placed meeting the December 12 deadline above the interest in at-
tempting to count every vote.
B. Article H Analysis'
1. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Concurring Opinion: The Florida Supreme
Court Has Gone Too Far.-The concurring opinion written by ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas avoided
much of the haziness that shrouded the per curiam opinion.2 °7 These
three Justices did not, however, disassociate themselves from the per
curiam opinion, which they joined,20 8 though one might imagine
203. Id.
204. Id. at 147.
205. Id. at 145.
206. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
207. Id. at 111.
208. Id.
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their having a certain distaste for it both because of its haziness and
because of its reliance on a nontextual exposition of individual
rights. 201 Without their votes, the per curiam opinion had only four
votes, at most, and only two votes with respect to the remedy and
much of the equal protection analysis. Thus, without the added votes
of the Justices who joined the concurring opinion, the lack of support
for the per curiam opinion would have increased the vulnerability of
the Court as it determined the outcome of the election. Of course,
there was an uproar after Bush 1,210 but imagine if the Court's critics
had been able to say that the Court gave the presidency to Bush citing
two completely different reasons, both of which were rejected by a
majority of the Justices!
Generally, the conservative side of the Court has been more en-
thusiastic about enforcing the structural parts of the Constitution, and
the liberal Justices have been more enthusiastic about enforcing indi-
vidual rights.211 It was probably necessary for the per curiam to speak
in terms of rights to draw the votes of Justices Souter and Breyer,
which were so valuable to the Court's appearance of legitimacy, be-
cause they rarely find structural constitutional arguments appeal-
ing.212 But the structural constitutional path taken in the concurring
opinion led to particularly serious problems because of the United
States Supreme Court's need to respect state court decisions of state
law. The Florida Supreme Court had taken care to word its opinion
to immunize it from the Article II attack. Following the helpful in-
structions the United States Supreme Court had provided in Bush I,
the Florida Supreme Court had expressed itself in completely statu-
tory terms; it acknowledged the legislature's full control over the ap-
209. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATtER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("What I look for in the
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not
what the original draftsmen intended."); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Con-
stitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976) (rejecting the notion of a living Constitution).
210. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 3, at 163-64. A full-page ad in the New York Times,
containing the names of six hundred law professors, stated "the U.S. Supreme Court used
its power to act as political partisans, not judges of a court of law." Id.
211. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (enforcing state sovereign immunity,
with four liberal justices dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (enforc-
ing constitutional federalism limitation, with four liberal justices dissenting).
212. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (SouterJ., dissenting) (joined, inter alia, by Justice
Breyer, rejecting constitutional sovereign immunity defense); Printz, 521 U.S. at 970 (Sou-
terJ., dissenting) (rejecting constitutional federalism argument and finding federal power
to use local government officials to enforce federal program); id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissent-




pointment of electors, but it attributed to the legislature all the ideas
it needed in support of the relief it gave.213 If the state is the final
expositor of state law, then that is what the legislature meant, and that
interpretation, one might argue, ought to have thwarted the Article II
attack.
The Chief Justice began with a reminder of the obvious-this is
an election for President of the United States 214-which aptly set the
tone by implying: this is a matter that, if it is to be determined by a
court, ought to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The functions performed by state institutions flow from the
United States Constitution and "implicate a uniquely important na-
tional interest." '215 The Chief Justice acknowledged that "comity and
respect for federalism . .. compel ... defer [ence]" to state court deci-
sions based on state law.2 16 Note the use of the idea of comity, defer-
ence, and respect, which suggest a flexible policy, not an absolute
matter of authority, not the idea that if the state court says this is state
law, it simply is state law. The ChiefJustice attributes this "practice" to
the "understanding that the decisions of state courts are definitive
pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns." 217
But federalism has to do not just with deference to the judicial
institutions of the state; there are other institutions as well. Some-
times, to defer to the state court is to deny deference to another com-
ponent of state government; principles of federalism may, for
example, demand that the state court be intruded upon out of defer-
213. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) ("These statutes estab-
lished by the legislature govern our decision today.").
214. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
215. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)).
216. Id.
217. Id. Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion refers to "our settled practice" of deferring
to the state court's final interpretive authority over state law. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The word "practice" suggests that it is just the Court's habitual way of behaving, as
opposed to a mandatory requirement stemming from dual sovereignty. Interestingly, the
ChiefJustice makes a "cf" reference to Erie RK. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Bush
II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Erie announced that federal courts sitting
in diversity jurisdiction must apply state law, including the state court's decisions interpret-
ing common law. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. When the state court says what the common law is,
according to Erie, it is not merely using its powers of reason to come up with the right
answer, it is using the power of the government that has put it in a position to bind the
parties that appear before it. Id. at 79. Courts, then, in Erie's view, are not just legally
trained answer-finders, they are agents of a particular sovereign. Id. Because they act for
the state, the answers they come up with-even through common law methodology-are
the law of a particular state, not any sort of general law. Id. This view of state courts could
be taken to require the United States Supreme Court to accept any interpretation of state
law the state court uses its power to make, undercutting the position the ChiefJustice takes
in Bush II, which finds a way to reject a state court opinion claim of reliance on state law.
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ence to the state legislature. Indeed, that was the case in Michigan v.
Long.2 " There, the state court, by muddling its interpretation of state
and federal law, had created a dysfunctional sort of insulation for it-
self: the United States Supreme Court seemed not able to review it, yet
the state democratic processes could not clearly see that they could
undo the results of the court's decision. 21 9 Long thus found deference
to the state court unwarranted.
The ChiefJustice acknowledged that ordinarily issues of state sep-
aration of powers can be resolved through state law.2 20 With respect
to the appointment of presidential electors, however, he noted that
the Constitution gives a particular role to one particular component
of the state, the state legislature. 22 1 Thus, Article II federalized an
aspect of state separation of powers law, making it a matter open to
United States Supreme Court review. 222 Here, the Florida Supreme
Court had made an assertion about what the state legislature in-
tended, yet it might have been quite wrong. Ordinarily, a state court's
being wrong about the meaning of a statute has no remedy (other
than amendment of the statute by the legislature, which would come
too late to affect the case). The state court's wrong answer binds as
tightly as a right answer: the court is "infallible .. .because [it] is
final. '2 23 But Article II, by interposing a federal question, makes the
state court no longer the final court. Article II does not, under the
Chief Justice's theory, completely open up the state court opinion to
review; but the United States Supreme Court can look at whether the
state court is too far out of line.224 If the state court has made a "sig-
nificant departure from the legislative scheme," its decision is not the
work of the state legislature but the work of the state court, and the
218. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
219. The state's legislature and people were led by the state court's muddled lawsaying
into thinking that the result was imposed by federal law, about which they could do noth-
ing on the state level. See id. at 1041. With the Long presumption, the United States Su-
preme Court can review the case, but the state court can avoid the presumption by making
a clear statement of its intent to rely on state law. Id. If the clear statement of reliance on
state law is made, the state court is able to avoid Supreme Court review, but the state's
legislature and people can now see the democratic paths toward changing the result, either
by setting the processes of state constitutional amendment in motion or by retaliating
against the state judges at their next election. See Althouse, supra note 44, at 1509.
220. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). As the ChiefJustice notes at
this point, the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4, imposes some limit on the state's
choices about how to allocate power among the branches of state government.
221. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
222. Id. at 113.
223. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
224. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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legislature has then been deprived of the role Article II explicitly as-
signed to it; the state court has usurped that role, in violation of Arti-
cle 11.225
The Chief Justice accordingly analyzed the Florida Supreme
Court interpretation of state law in this effort to determine whether
the state court had gone so far afield as to violate Article II. The Chief
Justice noted first that the Florida Supreme Court "acknowledged"
that the state legislature intended to take advantage of the federal stat-
utory safe harbor.226 Interestingly, he trusted the lawsaying compe-
tence of the state supreme court that far, but then did not go on to
trust that the state court knew the state legislature's intent when it
came up with some of its other ideas about what the legislature meant.
The Chief Justice then used the state court's opinion that the legisla-
ture meant to moor in the safe harbor as a basis for rejecting the state
court's interpretations that might frustrate that one goal.227 Other
goals found by the state court in the state statutes-notably the impor-
tance of counting ballots that reveal a "clear indication of the intent of
the voter"-did not qualify as bona fide interpretations of state law.228
The Chief Justice examined the state statutory provisions and con-
cluded that the state court had gone too far and has "wholly
change[d]" their meaning.2 29
This "independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law,"'230 ap-
propriate here where there is such a high national interest in the pres-
idential election and a specific federal constitutional provision
affecting state separation of powers, had precedent in United States
Supreme Court case law, the ChiefJustice noted.23 ' He discussed two
cases from the Warren Court's civil rights oeuvre, NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson212 and Bouie v. City of Columbia,2 3 which found ways to
stop state courts from using state law to thwart United States Supreme
Court review. 234 In Patterson, the Alabama state court had found the
NAACP in contempt for failing to comply with a discovery order to
produce the names of its members.235 The NAACP, which had as-
225. Id. at 112-13.
226. Id. at 113.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 118.
229. Id. at 114.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
233. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
234. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
235. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 454.
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serted the federal constitutional right to freedom of association as its
basis for refusing to comply with the order, sought review in the Ala-
bama Supreme Court through a writ of certiorari. 236 The Alabama
Supreme Court relied on a procedural ground to bar its review: man-
damus, not certiorari, was the proper writ to use to seek review of the
judgment.237 When the NAACP then sought review in the United
States Supreme Court, Alabama argued that the procedural ground
provided independent support for the outcome in state court, thus
barring United States Supreme Court review under the independent
and adequate state ground doctrine. 2 s The United States Supreme
Court, using its authoritative control over the scope of the indepen-
dent and adequate state ground doctrine, shaped that doctrine with
an eye toward preventing the state court from trumping up a state law
ground to "thwart" Supreme Court review.239 Under the doctrine, the
Court would thus not view as adequate a state law ground that was
"without any fair or substantial support. ' 240 With the doctrine thus
interpreted, it became the proper work of the United States Supreme
Court to analyze the quality of the state court's state law interpreta-
tion. Parsing the state supreme court's reasons for requiring a writ of
mandamus, the Court analyzed many earlier state law cases. Even
though it could perceive a "consistent pattern . . . in retrospect," it
declared that pattern too obscure to expect the petitioner to have per-
ceived it and too insubstantial to deprive the Supreme Court of its
power.241 The advantage of going first and the authority over state
law would not be allowed to provide endless control over what the
United States Supreme Court saw as its important role with respect to
constitutional rights. The Court did not write a word about the role it
perceived for itself in protecting the NAACP from the southern
courts, but it is easy enough for readers to infer that the Court's re-
fusal to take a position of supine deference to state courts was
strengthened by its perception of the realities of the world beyond the
immediate text of the opinions it reviewed.
236. Id
237. Id. at 454-55.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 457.
240. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 457. Justice Frankfurter's statement in the conference on this case is helpful
on this point: "The state procedure is so doubtful that this is, in effect, retroactive. The
state procedure is so uncertain that the NAACP's federal right is being lost." THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE, 1940-1985, at 311 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). More bluntly, Justice
Black said, "The state . . . should not be allowed to defeat the federal courts." Id.
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In Bouie, the state court had made a strained interpretation of a
state criminal trespass statute: it read a state statute that banned "entry
upon the lands of another ... after notice from the owner or tenant
prohibiting such entry. . ." to cover a situation where persons invited
to enter had failed to leave when requested.242 This contorted inter-
pretation was used to convict black civil rights proponents who had
engaged in a sit-in at a whites-only lunch counter.24 The United
States Supreme Court, desirous of overturning the result but never-
theless respectful in general of the rights of private property owners
against trespass, found a way to achieve its end: the interpretation of
the state statute was so strained it deprived the petitioners of the fair
warning required by constitutional due process.244 The Court relied
on "the standards of state decisional consistency" used to review the
state court decision on the state law ground in NAACP v. Alabama.245
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court, looking deeply into
state law precedent, denounced the state court's state law interpreta-
tion as "so clearly at variance with the statutory language" and lacking
"the slightest support in prior South Carolina decisions." 246 Again,
the case arose in a context of state courts that had earned the suspi-
cion of the United States Supreme Court,247 and the Court found a
way to use federal law to prevent the state court from using its author-
ity over state law interpretation to immunize itself from review.
The ChiefJustice saw the Bush case as "precisely parallel. '24  The
state court's strained, result-oriented interpretation of the state statu-
tory law was so "impermissibly distorted ... beyond what a fair reading
required" that it violated Article 11.249 Like the United States Supreme
Court in Bouie, the ChiefJustice did not purport to substitute his inter-
pretation of state law for the state court's interpretation of state law;
rather, he found that the high degree of distortion in the interpreta-
tion made for a violation of federal law.2 5 Those who say there was
242. Bouje v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1964).
243. Id. at 350.
244. Id. at 362.
245. Id. at 354.
246. Id. at 356.
247. See Robert Jerome Glennon, TheJurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61
TENN. L. REv. 869, 870 (1994) (noting that during the 1950s and 60s, the Supreme Court
shaped jurisdictional doctrine to increase access to the federal courts because it saw some
state courts as "lack[ing] good faith in handling the federal claims of civil rights demon-
strators" and "unmistakably hostile to the constitutional claims of African-American
litigants").
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no "deference" to the state court in the concurring opinion fail to
acknowledge this point. The deference is there, but it is not endless;
it is not "blind deference. '25 1 It ends where the state court's interpre-
tation is too distorted. Thus, the Chief Justice analyzed the various
relevant provisions of the state statutory scheme in an effort to discern
not the actual meaning, but only to establish that the state court's
interpretation is far enough off the mark to overcome the usual ac-
ceptance of the state court resolution of the case, to rebut the pre-
sumption that the state has acted in good faith in its role as final
expositor of state law.252 When a question of state law is plugged into
a federal law issue, the United States Supreme Court has the power to
reject a sham interpretation. It has the responsibility, one might say,
as it makes this connection between state and federal law, to ensure
that the "plug" is not defective.
It is important to acknowledge that this is what the opinion says,
but that naturally does not entirely shield the Chief Justice from criti-
cism. Did the Chief Justice himself act a bit like the Alabama court
discovering the wrong writ problem or the South Carolina court dis-
covering a strange meaning for the trespass statute? Did he strain Ar-
ticle II to reach his preferred outcome? As the Chief Justice pointed
to the state court's distortion of state law and used that to detect a
federal question in the tangle of state law out of which the state court
may have manufactured an illicit power, he exposed his own work to
the criticism that he distorted the law to manufacture an illicit power.
Quite aside from how one might resolve the questions about
whether any of the judges used sham interpretation to seize illicit
power, it is apparent that in conflicts of judicial authority, one can
easily see the advantage to going first and the advantage to going last.
The state court in going first can use the interpretation of state law to
shield itself from the review of the United States Supreme Court, and
that advantage in going first frequently works. The United States Su-
preme Court in going last, however, gets to have the final say in shap-
251. SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); supra text accompanying notes 81-84
(discussing Younger).
252. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111-23 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). For example, the
Chief Justice writes:
No reasonable person would call it "an error in the vote tabulation," . . . or a
"rejection of legal votes," . . . when electronic or electromechanical equipment
performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails to count those ballots that
are not marked in the manner that these voting instructions explicitly and promi-
nently specify.
Id. at 119 (footnote and internal citations omitted). That is, the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation was not just incorrect, it was not rational-it was "inconceivable." Id, at 119
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ing the doctrine that determines the effectiveness of state law
insulation from Supreme Court review, and it can use that position of
going last to produce an opinion that, however strained, cannot be
reversed.
2. Justices Souter and Breyer: The Florida Supreme Court Has Not Gone
Too Far.-Justices Souter and Breyer, who dissented from the position
taken in the concurring opinion, did not disagree with the proposi-
tion that it is possible for the state court to distort the law so far that it
should be viewed as having "displaced" the decisions of the state legis-
lature.253 The question was whether the state court's work deserved to
be considered actual statutory interpretation or some new, judicial
creation. They dissented because, to them, the state court's opinion
was not so unreasonable as to lose its quality of being statutory inter-
pretation.254 The opinion lay "within the bounds of reasonable inter-
pretation. 255 There was thus no "displacement" of the legislature's
choice and, consequently, no Article II violation.256 Justice Souter ac-
knowledged that other interpretations were possible and even better,
but the point was only whether the Florida Supreme Court had gone
toofar.257 Similarly, Justice Breyer parsed the ChiefJustice's analysis of
the Florida court's purported statutory interpretation and asked:
"[W]here is the 'impermissible' distortion?"2 58
Justices Souter and Breyer disagreed with the concurring opinion
over the degree of distortion in the state court's interpretation. They
did not say whether it was unreasonable for the Chief Justice to find
that the state court's interpretation was distorted to the point of un-
reason, but they did not need to do so in order to reach their deci-
sion: they only needed to decide that the state court decision did not
go too far afield in its interpretation of state law.259
253. Id. at 130-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).




258. Id. at 152 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
259. Justices Souter and Breyer's mode of expression is notably more moderate than
that of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. See infta pt. IV.C (discussing the tone and substance
of the dissenting opinions written by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg). Of course, the four
liberal justices all wrote opinions and all joined each other's opinions, which makes the
stark differences in both tone and substance among the four opinions difficult to fathom.
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C. The Attacks Premised on Hypocrisy About Judicial Restraint and
Federalism
1. Justice Stevens and the Rhetoric of Respect. -Justice Stevens began
his dissenting opinion by stating the central premise that state courts
have final interpretive authority over state law.2 6 ° Despite the intense
national interest in presidential elections, in Justice Stevens's view,
only state law had any significance.2 6 ' To Justice Stevens, the federal
questions were trumped up trivialities, asserted in an attempt to avoid
the overwhelming reality that the federal Constitution made the ap-
pointment of presidential electors a state law matter, and the state
court thus controlled the outcome.2 6 2 In this view, Article II gave no
entre into this thoroughly state law issue because it gave power to the
state legislatures, not as entities torn out of the whole fabric of state
government, but as they really exist, "as creatures born of, and con-
strained by, their state constitutions."2 6 3 Florida's constitution pro-
vided for judicial review, and the state legislature, even as it
performed a task assigned to it by the federal Constitution, cannot
escape that review. 2 4 As Justice Stevens saw it, whether the state court
had claimed to be using statutory interpretation or had openly ap-
plied state constitutional law, the result would be an interpretation of
state law immune to federal review.
Although Justice Stevens rejected the per curiam opinion's equal
protection analysis, he did note that if he thought the Equal Protec-
tion Clause justified interference with the state court's state law inter-
pretation, he would say that it required a continuation of the recount,
not a stop to it, because the Equal Protection Clause, as the majority
itself admitted, should be understood as protecting "the right to have
one's vote counted." '2 6 5 For Justice Stevens, the Florida Supreme
Court deserved autonomy here, where it simply "did what courts do":
it operated within the Marbury "province... to say what the law is." 266
The state court's lawsaying did not cross the line into an illegitimate
use of legal interpretation to achieve a political end.26 7 Having taken
this position, Justice Stevens could indirectly compliment himself for




264. Id. at 123-24.
265. Id. at 126.
266. Id. at 128 & n.7 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
267. See id. at 128.
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believing in the impartiality of the state courts by accusing the major-
ity of the Court of assuming otherwise:
What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the
Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence
in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges .... The
endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court
can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the
work of judges throughout the land.268
Of course, the reader need not believe that Justice Stevens
reached his decision because he genuinely thought the Florida Su-
preme Court was playing it straight. If he in fact sought only to
achieve his own personal preference, he would not have admitted it,
but would have covered up his illegitimate use of power by adopting
the pose ofjudicial restraint, deferring to the state court that had con-
veniently presented him with his desired outcome. The majority
found itself in the more awkward position of having to reject the state
court's interpretation of state law, which left it with no option but to
engage in the sort of disparagement of another court that it too avoids
when it can. But one could fairly think that the Florida Supreme
Court's work deserved disparagement. That is, rejecting what that
court did could have resulted from a nonpolitical assessment just as it
could have come from pure political preference. My point here is
only that there is nothing aboutJustice Stevens's ability to say that he
and not the majority believes in the good faith of the Florida Supreme
Court that proves that he and not the majority was acting apart from
political preference. It is possible that all were pursuing political ends
and possible that none were.
Justice Stevens ended his opinion with prophetic sermonizing
that caught the attention of many of the journalists covering the Bush
v. Gore litigation:
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the
judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.
Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that
will be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is
certain. Although we may never know with complete cer-
tainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential
election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the
Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of
the rule of law.269
268. Id.
269. Id. at 128-29.
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But what is this really saying? To decide the case my way would pre-
serve the illusion that people have that courts do their work in a prop-
erly pure spirit? Yet the statement itself openly invites people to cast
aside that illusion. The per curiam and the concurring opinions were
crafted, however hastily and imperfecdy, to give the appearance,
whether true or false, that the law demanded a particular outcome.
That is what judicial opinions, including the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion, usually do. If Justice Stevens were really worried about the
injuries to the nation caused by breeding mistrust for the courts, he
would have expressed his anxieties only in closed chambers. Indeed,
he could have joined the majority to help give people confidence that
the Court was the neutral, prestigious agent of the rule of law that
people would like it to be. The decision to print that paragraph, then,
has at least as much significance as the words' literal meaning.
Justice Stevens and the other liberal Justices do not make a gen-
eral practice of showing deference to state courts. Many of their opin-
ions are highly critical of the work of state courts; a vigorous
enforcement of constitutional rights, for example, in habeas cases, re-
quires that one take a hard look at their work.2 70 In such cases, these
Justices are not swayed by platitudes about state courts being "the true
backbone of the rule of law."27 1 The most fundamental aspect ofjudi-
cial comity is that one keeps the argument at the legal level, even
when, because one is applying a standard that looks for abuse of dis-
cretion or unreasonableness or "impermissible distortion,"272 one can-
not avoid sounding critical of the other court. Justice Stevens's final
statement is a criticism about creating the impression the state court
270. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In Williams, Justice Stevens, joined
in the key Section II portion of the opinion by Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, inter-
preted an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), made by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), to preserve the role of the federal courts on habeas:
When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction under the "judi-
cial Power" of Article III of the Constitution, it is "emphatically the province and
duty" of those judges to "say what the law is." ... At the core of this power is the
federal courts' independent responsibility-independent from its coequal
branches in the Federal Government, and independent from the separate author-
ity of the several States-to interpret federal law. A construction of AEDPA that
would require the federal courts to cede this authority to the courts of the States
would be inconsistent with the practice that federal judges have traditionally fol-
lowed in discharging their duties under Article III of the Constitution. If Con-
gress had intended to require such an important change in the exercise of our
jurisdiction, we believe it would have spoken with much greater clarity than is
found in the text of AEDPA.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 378-79 (internal citations omitted).
271. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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was acting politically. If the "rule of law" were really about the appear-
ance that there is a rule of law, everyone would have a duty to keep up
those appearances; perhaps no one should ever write a dissenting
opinion. But plainly, that is not the system we have. Comity demands
that one address the legal reasons given by the other side as if they
were the real reasons and respond to legal arguments, however bad,
with more legal arguments. The rule of law, quite independently, de-
mands that legal reasons actually support the decisions.
The per curiam and the concurring opinions, to reach their con-
clusions, could not avoid criticism of the state court, but these opin-
ions adhered to the practices of comity and focused only on the
quality of the legal reasoning. They did not accuse the state court of
political bias, even though they may have been fueled by suspicion
about the state court's partiality. Justice Stevens himself did not ac-
cuse the per curiam or the Chief Justice of partiality: he only accused
them of making people think the Florida Supreme Court was not im-
partial. There was room for his disagreement with the legal grounds
used by the per curiam and by the Chief Justice, to be sure, but the
rhetoric about respect for state judges, effective though it was in win-
ning attention in the press,27 added nothing of legal substance. Talk
about respect for state judges is only meaningful in the context of true
engagement with the question whether they deserve respect.
2. Justice Ginsburg: The Rhetoric of Restraint and Federalism. -In her
dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, like Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, accepted the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state
law as real statutory interpretation.274 But, like Justice StevensJustice
Ginsburg also took the opportunity to expatiate on the importance of
respecting state court decisions.275 She considered it relevant to point
to the deference shown by federal courts to state court decisions of
federal law in habeas cases,2 76 in which federal courts can only review
state court decisions about constitutional law that have flouted the
case law in existence at the time of the trial277 and may only review
Fourth Amendment decisions if the state court has failed to provide a
full and fair opportunity to litigate."7
273. The search "complete certainty identity winner and loser perfectly clear" in the
Nexis News Group File, Most Recent Two Years, produced 362 hits on November 4, 2001.
274. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 136-43.
276. Id. at 136-37.
277. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990).
278. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976).
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The United States Supreme Court's habeas jurisdiction is compli-
cated and controversial. It is also largely unknown even to most law-
yers. But it is important for those attempting to understand Justice
Ginsburg's criticism to understand that on habeas, a federal district
judge assesses the constitutionality of the custody of a prisoner. The
liberal side of the United States Supreme Court has long character-
ized the district judge in a habeas case as a surrogate for the United
States Supreme Court.27 The notion is that the criminal defendant
deserves federal review of his federal rights, and, with the United
States Supreme Court unavailable to review every such case, that the
federal district judges are called into service to cover for it. This posi-
tion has long been rejected by the majority of the Court, which sees
habeas not as the equivalent of Supreme Court review, but as a differ-
ent kind of inquiry into the justice of continued custody, which takes
into account the interests in finality that come into being after a con-
viction and after all of the opportunities for appeal, including petition
to the United States Supreme Court, have expired.28 °
Justice Ginsburg's Bush II opinion repeated a quote from Profes-
sor Paul Bator: "there is 'no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is
a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious,
or learned with respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in the state
courthouse.' "281 She used this quote to suggest that if we trust state
279. This position was championed by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in the
case justice Ginsburg cited, Stone v. Powell
The Court, however, simply ignores the settled principle that for purposes of ad-
judicating constitutional claims Congress, which has the power to do so under
Art. III of the Constitution, has effectively cast the district courts sitting in habeas
in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts .... [T]o the extent Congress has ac-
corded the federal district courts a role in our constitutional scheme functionally
equivalent to that of the Supreme Court with respect to review of state-court reso-
lutions of federal constitutional claims, it is evident that the Court's direct/collat-
eral review distinction for constitutional purposes simply collapses.
Id. at 511-12 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
280. See, for example, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), in which Justice O'Connor
quotes Warren Era dissenter Justice Harlan:
Habeas corpus always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upset-
ting judgments that have become otherwise final. It is not designed as a substi-
tute for direct review. The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of
repose, that is, reducing the controversy to a finaljudgment not subject to further
judicial revision, may quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defin-
ing the scope of the writ to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the com-
peting interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in
effect when a habeas petition is filed.
Id. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)).
281. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 136-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 494
n.35 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
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courts with federal law, surely we ought to trust them with state law.282
But let us look more closely at what Professor Bator meant. He em-
phasized the idea that state courts are courts over the idea that state
courts are part of the state government. 2 3 The notion is that all
courts are committed to an orthodox judicial method that requires
them to consult and analyze the appropriate legal texts and prece-
dents and to resolve any conflicts in the sources of law by putting legal
authority in its proper hierarchy. Thus, state judges like federal
judges may, indeed must,2 8 4 apply federal constitutional rights and
give them priority over state law. If it were not so, state courts could
not be trusted with criminal cases, the overwhelming majority of
which they must handle.28 5 We accept that many people are in prison
as a result of state court interpretations of federal law, and the federal
district courts are not called into action to redo all of their work. The
doctrines of habeas corpus govern this area of federal court jurisdic-
tion. A habeas corpus case, as viewed by the Supreme Court's major-
ity, is a new case seeking to undo the results of an earlier case, an
exception to the usual effect of res judicata doctrine.28 6
But the United States Supreme Court in Bush II did not face the
reopening of an old case, so it did not need to balance the interest in
finality. It was an instance of appellate review on questions of federal
law, and the United States Supreme Court is in a hierarchically supe-
rior position to the Florida Supreme Court with respect to the inter-
pretation of federal law. A forthright performance of its authority to
interpret federal law did not implicate the matters that concerned
Professor Bator. It was not an assertion that the United States Su-
preme Court is "more competent, or conscientious, or learned"8 "
than the Florida Supreme Court about federal law, but only an asser-
tion that it is the final authority. As Justice Jackson once aptly wrote
Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963))). A Lexis check reveals thatJustice Ginsburg is
the first Justice since Stone to repeat that Bator quote. The unpopularity of this pithy and
conspicuous quote is due, one suspects, to the fact that none of the Justices, including
Justice Ginsburg, believes it.
282. See id. at 136 (stating that "not uncommonly, we let stand state-court interpretations
of federal law with which we might disagree").
283. See Bator, supra note 281, at 509. This is exactly the opposite emphasis from that
expressed in Erie, which the Chief Justice discussed. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). See supra note 217 (discussing the Erie citation).
284. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby .... ").
285. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 n.8 (1983).
286. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
287. Bator, supra note 281, at 509.
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about the role of the United States Supreme Court: "We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final. 288 It is simply obfuscation to characterize Supreme Court re-
view on questions of federal law as inherently insulting to the state
courts.
Of course, the concurring opinion scrutinized the state court's
interpretation of state law because of the way it was linked to the Arti-
cle II question.2 9 And, indeed, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that
sometimes the Court must "examine state law in order to protect fed-
eral rights."29 ° "But," she added, "we have dealt with such cases ever
mindful of the full measure of respect we owe to interpretations of
state law by a State's highest court. ' 291  Nothing in this statement,
however, amounts to a valid objection to what the concurring opinion
did because one must still ask: How much respect is owed? Wen is that
respect-measuring cup full? Again, it should be apparent that the real
disagreement is what we have seen throughout the analysis of the dis-
senting opinions: Did the Florida Supreme Court go too far? Just how
bad was the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation? Was it within a
reasonable range of defectiveness that still implies genuine interpreta-
tion of the state statutes? Or was it unreasonable-so distorted that it
was right to see it as a substitution of the state court's own preference
for the statute? Talk about the "full measure of respect" is rhetoric
that we should not permit to distract us from seeing that the real disa-
greement is about what to infer from the degree of distortion in the
state court's opinion.
Justice Ginsburg explained Patterson and Bouie through their "his-
torical context."292 As she saw it, the Court really meant to express
suspicion about the good faith of the southern state courts in those
288. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Consider the
lines that precede Justice Jackson's famous quote:
Conflict with state courts is the inevitable result of giving the convict a virtual new
trial before a federal court sitting without a jury. Whenever decisions of one
court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a
difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different
courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby
better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a sub-
stantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed.
Id. Justice Jackson was, it should be noted, writing about habeas corpus and distancing
himself from the majority's approach, which envisioned the federal district judge as a
stand-in for the United States Supreme Court.
289. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
290. Id. at 137 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 140.
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civil rights era cases. 29 3 Those cases were very unusual departures
from the usual practice of the Court, according to Justice Ginsburg.29 4
But Bush v. Gore-was it not an unusual case? Did the Florida Su-
preme Court stand out in the long history of courts the United States
Supreme Court has had to deal with? Perhaps it did. Perhaps our
view of whether it did or did not depends, for each of us, on whether
we felt joy or anger when that final statewide recount was ordered.
Justice Ginsburg cited the Guarantee Clause29 5 to show that the
Framers viewed the state in a context that included judicial review. 296
She argued that it is wrong to read Article II as speaking to the legisla-
tures outside of their place within a republican form of government.
In this light, it is wrong, she wrote, for the United States Supreme
Court to interpose itself between two branches of the state govern-
ment.297 Even if Article II did "implicate a structural constraint," she
contended, "Congress, not this Court, is likely the proper governmen-
tal entity to enforce that constraint."298 Congress is "likely" to have the
role of enforcing constitutional law? Why? The Court does view some
constitutional matters as nonjusticiable political questions when it
293. See id. at 140-41.
294. Id.
295. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government .. ").
296. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (comparing the Article IV notion
of a "Republican Form of Government" to the Framers' understanding of the role of Arti-
cle III federal courts and concluding that "Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court
to disrupt a State's republican regime").
297. Id.
298. Id. at 142 n.2. Justice Ginsburg cited case law holding that the Guarantee Clause
presents only a "a nonjusticiable political question." Id. In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,
241 U.S. 565 (1916), one of the cases cited by Justice Ginsburg, state election officers had
unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus from the state supreme court to bar the use of
the results of a referendum affecting that state's apportionment of legislative districts. Id.
at 566. In that case, the Court refused to consider the state court's rejection of challenges
premised on state law, considered and rejected a federal statutory challenge, and rejected
the challenge based on the Guarantee Clause relying on its longstanding position that the
Guarantee Clause "presents no justiciable controversy but involves the exercise by Con-
gress of the authority vested in it by the Constitution." Id. at 568-69. That is, the Constitu-
tion vests "exclusive authority -to uphold the guarantee of a republican form of
government" in Congress. Id. at 570. The conclusion that the Guarantee Clause presents
only a political question has been widely discussed and criticized. See, e.g., Erwin Chemer-
insky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should BeJusticiable, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 849 (1994)
(finding that the Guarantee Clause does not fit the political question doctrine). But in
recent years, the Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to avoid many of the
problems that would otherwise be caused by placing the Guarantee Clause beyond judicial
purview. See Ann Althouse, Time for the Federal Courts to Enforce the Guarantee Clause?-A
Response to Professor Chemerinsky, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 881 (1994) (arguing that the availabil-
ity of the Equal Protection alternative has removed the pressure to overrule longstanding
precedent).
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finds a "textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate
branch, ' 29' but it would be odd to use the political question doctrine
to prevent the Court from dealing with a state court that had itself vio-
lated federal constitutional law. A matter is a political question when
it comes up within the context of a function that the Constitution has
assigned to Congress or the Executive-the only branches "coordi-
nate" to the judiciary. Thus, in the only recent case finding a new
political question, the Court could not reconsider a constitutional
question that arose with respect to the way the Senate had carried out
its constitutionally assigned task of trying an impeachment.3"' It
would be quite another thing if the Bush-Gore controversy had con-
tinued into January and Congress had made a go of resolving it as it
performed its constitutionally assigned role of counting the electoral
votes. If at that point Governor Bush or Vice President Gore had
sought judicial relief from the result produced by the processes in
Congress, some of the "symptoms '  of a political question would
have been present. But the Florida Supreme Court's decision
presented none of the classic symptoms of a political question. Even if
one were to decide to start using the political question doctrine for
tasks the Constitution assigns to the state, the only state institution
with a constitutionally assigned task was the state legislature. It would
299. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993).
300. Id.
301. Chief Justice Warren Burger, when he was a circuit court judge, used the term
"symptoms" to describe the factors listed in Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The
"symptoms," as listed in Baker, are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department;
[2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
[3) or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
[4] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
[5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made;
[6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
369 U.S. at 217. According to Baker, if all of these factors were absent, there is no political
question. Id. Baker did not say when the presence of one or more factors would make a
question into a political question. In Powell then-Judge Burger had diagnosed a political
question. 395 F.2d at 596. The United States Supreme Court reversed this finding, giving
a notably narrow meaning to the doctrine. 395 U.S. at 548. It emphasized the first of the
Baker factors, id., as did the Rehnquist Court, many years later in Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
The idea of using the political question doctrine as a general way to keep courts out of
political areas or to show deference for the political branches is not supported by the case
law.
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take some serious doctrinal juggling to turn that "textual commit-
ment" into a reason for leaving the state court alone, as it interfered with
the operation of the state legislature. Preventing the United States Su-
preme Court from reviewing a state court violation of federal constitu-
tional law would seem to be the least appropriate place for the
political question doctrine.
When Justice Ginsburg wrote that "Congress, not this Court, is
likely the proper governmental entity to enforce that constraint,"30 2 it
is possible that she did not mean to suggest that Article II raised only a
nonjusticiable political question, even though she did follow this state-
ment with citations to cases that relied on the political question doc-
trine. 30 ' The United States Supreme Court can avoid cases by simply
denying certiorari,3 0 4 so it has no duty to decide questions of constitu-
tional law even when they are justiciable. In deciding whether to vote
to grant certiorari, the Justices might very well take into account
whether the Court ought to remain aloof from a hot political contro-
versy that may resolve itself in some other manner. Looked at in
terms of cert policy, the dispute between Justice Ginsburg and the
concurring opinion becomes a difference of opinion about how un-
reasonable and chaotic the recount actually was, the matter most sus-
ceptible to subjectivity influenced by one's preference for Gore or
Bush.
In addition to criticizing the majority for deviating from its usual
practices of judicial restraint, Justice Ginsburg criticized it for be-
traying its usual interest in federalism: "Were the other members of
this Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sover-
eignty, they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court."30 5 This sounds weighty, but it is yet another way of saying
what is said repeatedly throughout the dissenting opinions: we disa-
gree with the majority about whether the state court deserves defer-
ence. No one believes in endless, blind deference. To the extent that
Justice Ginsburg's statement reads as an accusation of hypocrisy, it re-
flects both ways. Why is the liberal side of the Court so "mindful" of
federalism now? What amount of deference did the Florida Supreme
Court deserve for its actions? Perhaps the majority underestimated it,
but perhaps the dissenters overestimated it. General imprecations
about federalism and deference do not get us any closer to the
answer.
302. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 142 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
303. See id.
304. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
305. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 142-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Clearing away the rhetoric, the crucial part of the discussion of
Article II in Bush II is the scrutiny of the state court's discussion of
specific provisions of the Florida statutes and the analysis of whether
the Florida Supreme Court stretched too far. Surely, people will disa-
gree about whether or not the Florida Supreme Court went over the
line, but we should see that that was the crux of the dispute between
the concurring and the dissenting Justices. It was ajudgment call, and
the judgment of some, all, or none of them was influenced to some
unknown degree by their preference for Bush or Gore. We simply
cannot know, and we must acknowledge that our own judgment is
influenced by our own preference.
CONCLUSION
Among courts, the United States Supreme Court goes last. With
no higher court, it cannot be reversed. It has the pseudo-infallibility
of finality.3" 6 Yet the United States Supreme Court is not insulated
from criticism, and of course, criticism has been aimed at its work in
the Bush-Gore litigation. Much of that criticism deserves its own criti-
cism because it too can rationalize and distort to serve the preferences
of the writer, who, one can assume, preferred one of the candidates in
the 2000 election. That criticism of criticism, to which I add my little
part here, can go on ad infinitum, unlike litigation, which has to come
to an end, especially when there is a presidential inauguration that
must take place and a nation with urgent interests in a smooth transi-
tion to a new administration.
Many of those who were hoping to see a shift in the votes that
would elect Al Gore contended that we could afford several more
weeks of uncertainty and a political fight in Congress to make the final
determination. Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens all
thought the United States Supreme Court ought to have sat out the
dispute and left it to Congress to right any wrongs that the various
efforts in Florida might have caused. In 2000, we lived in a golden era
of peace and prosperity, and the nightly news showing Floridians
holding ballots up to the light in search of degrees of chad detach-
ment made a somewhat entertaining TV show. But as Justice Stevens
wrote in Printz v. United States- "[S]ince the ultimate issue is one of
power, we must consider its implications in times of national emer-
gency."3 °7 Printz held that Congress may not "commandeer" the exec-
utive branch officials of state and local government, in a case that
306. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
307. 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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involved the use of local law enforcement officials to do background
checks on gun purchasers. 30 ' Dissenting, Justice Stevens stressed the
seriousness of finding a lack of power to do something that might be
extremely important in an emergency. 309 With chilling prescience,
which might lead some of those who approved of Printz to rethink,
Justice Stevens wrote:
Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the ad-
ministration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of chil-
dren to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an
international terrorist, may require a national response
before federal personnel can be made available to
respond.3 10
Could we have endured the instability and delay of waiting until Janu-
ary if the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had occurred on
Election Day? Perhaps it is enough of an answer to say, without doubt,
Al Gore would have conceded the election immediately. Perhaps the
answer suggested in Printz was enough: in an emergency, state and
local officials would instantly and actively cooperate. 3 ''
Did the members of the Court who managed to end the election
controversy on December 12 go wrong? The concurring opinion
dared to take a close look at the state court's statutory interpretation
and declare it a sham. That could be seen as taking over the state
court's role of saying what state law is, but there must be some limit to
the extremes to which a state court can go in calling things state law.
The United States Supreme Court has a duty to defend its own lawsay-
ing role. Did the per curiam opinion arrogate a power to determine
state law by assuming there was nothing more to decide about the
deadline? But the Florida Supreme Court had committed itself to the
December 12 deadline, and one can well understand the good sense
in denying that court a chance to reconsider.
The per curiam opinion's closing paragraph is a plea for belief:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial au-
thority than are the members of this Court, and none stand
more in admiration of the Constitution's design to leave the
selection of the President to the people, through their legis-
latures, and to the political sphere. When contending par-
ties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our
308. 521 U.S. at 935.
309. Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Id.
311. 521 U.S. at 905-17 (noting the ability of state and local government officials to
voluntarily participate in carrying out a federal government program).
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unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitu-
tional issues the judicial system has been forced to
confront.312
Just as the Florida Supreme Court had cloaked itself in the lan-
guage of statutory interpretation in what seems to have been an effort
to protect itself from the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court, though it had no higher court from which it
needed shielding, wrapped itself in the language of judicial restraint
in what seems to have been an effort to protect itself from the attack
to which it is exposed: criticism in "the political sphere. 3  In a
stroke of poetic justice, even as the Florida court's references to statu-
tory interpretation could not protect it from the attack of a United
States Supreme Court that is determined to reverse it, the United
States Supreme Court's references to the unwilled, apolitical nature of
its role could not shield it from the attacks of those who are deter-
mined to criticize. The Supreme Court's critics themselves use the
cloak of language and are subject to rejection when people do not
take their writings at face value.
In the end, Bush v. Gore works best as a rich and revealing case
study of the human mind in action. Everyone who talks about Bush v.
Gore without admitting that they are engaged in the same kind of
cloaking and advancing of personally preferred ends is still an active
participant in that larger display. If I could only get outside of it my-
self, I would love to be able to describe the whole picture; but for now,
I will end my effort, having attempted to show something of the inter-
play between the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Su-
preme Court as both courts, though they were staffed by human
beings who had to have cared about who became President, struggled
within a system of separated state and federal legal authority and or-
thodoxy about the role of judges. Myself, I do not doubt that they
meant to use their power constrained by this authority and orthodoxy.
The inevitable imperfection of their work does not deserve outraged
accusations. At the very least, those who would criticize ought to see
how the judges who voted for the outcome the critics liked were all
doing something that they would have found a way to criticize if they
had felt so motivated.
312. Bush II, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam).
313. Id.
20021 575
